Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act: Another Step toward a National Law of Unfair Trade Practices by Dole, Richard F., Jr.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1967
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act: Another
Step toward a National Law of Unfair Trade
Practices
Richard F. Dole Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dole, Richard F. Jr., "Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act: Another Step toward a National Law of Unfair Trade Practices" (1967).
Minnesota Law Review. 2163.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2163
1005
The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act:
Another Step Toward a National Law
of Unfair Trade Practices
Richard F. Dole, Jr.*
Be it Resolved, That it is the sentiment of the Section that there
should be uniformity in the law of unfair competition among the
respective states and. that the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws be urged by the American
Bar Association to make a study to determine the feasibility of
promulgating a Uniform Code of Unfair Competition and to
draft such a code if they find it to be feasible and desirable.,
The National Conference of Conmmissioners on Uniform State
Laws2 accepted this invitation of the ABA Section of Patent,
Trademark, and Copyright Law in 1959.3 In August 1964, after
several years of discussion and numerous tentative drafts, both
the National Conference and the ABA House of Delegates recom-
mended the enactment of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Act by "all the States."4  As of June 1967, the act had
been passed in six states.5 This article surveys the need for the
* Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of Law; Visit-
ing Associate Professor, University of Mlinnesota Law School, 1967. This
article, which was accepted at the University of Michigan Law School
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the S.J.D. degree, does not
necessarily reflect the views of the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws.
1. ABA PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT SECTION, PROCEEDINGS
45 (1958) [hereinafter cited as ABA PROCEEDINGS].
2. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws is an organization of state officials which was formed in 1892 in
order to promote uniformity in state laws. Commissioners are appointed
by the governor or legislature of a state and serve without compensation.
Francis, 1961 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, 25 Ky. S.B.J. 201 (1961); see generally Dunham, A History of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 30 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 233 (1965).
3. 1959 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CoMinssIoNERs ON UNIFORM
STATE LAws, HANDBoox 66-67.
4. 1964 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMIVIISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK 131-32, 89 A.B.A. REP. 405 (1964). Following a
resolution by the ABA Section of Patent, Trademark, and Copyright
Law, the Commissioners have revised § 3(b) of the act dealing with
allowance of costs and attorneys' fees. 1965 ABA PROCEEDINGS 54-56, 64-
66; 91 A.B.A. REP. 357 (1966). The official and current version of the
act appears in 9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. The original version of the act is
set out in OPPENHEim, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES App. E (2d ed. 1965).
5. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-115(c) to -115(f) (Supp. 1966);
DEL. CODE tit. 6, §§ 2531-37 (Supp. 1966); IDAHO CODE AIN. §§ 48-601 to
-606 (Supp. 1965); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121%, §§ 311-17 (1965); KAN. GEN.
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Deceptive Trade Practices Act and offers a prognosis concerning
the effect of the Uniform Act on the law of unfair competition
or unfair trade practices.6
I. THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY WITH RESPECT TO
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES LAW
Commentators have repeatedly asserted a need for nation-
wide uniformity with respect to unfair trade practices law. 7 In-
deed, the need for uniformity has become a slogan. The bill of
particulars for uniformity encountered in the law reviews has
become standardized into the following principal allegations:
(1) prior to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,8 most unfair trade practices
cases were brought in federal courts and decided without refer-
ence to state law;9
(2) Erie deprived this "progressive and well-reasoned" body of
federal decisions of precedential value;10
(3) state law, which had atrophied while the federal courts ap-
plied general principles of law in unfair trade practice cases, is
"archaic" and "variegated;"1 1
(4) Erie has resulted in the importation into the federal courts
of the conflict of laws problems posed in state courts by multi-
state unfair trade practices;12
STAT. ANN. §§ - (Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 78, §§ 51-55
(Supp. 1966). The Oklahoma enactment contains substantial deviations
from the recommended version of the act. Merrill, Oklahoma and the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1965,
36 OKLA. B.A.J. 2205-08 (1965).
6. "Unfair competition" has been outmoded as a designation for
this area of law because conduct by noncompetitors as well as competi-
tors is often actionable. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Introductory Note Ch. 35,
at 536-37 (1938). Both "unfair competition" and "unfair trade practices"
signify injurious commercial conduct which is actionable by private
persons.
7. E.g., Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARv. L. REV. 1289, 1298-
1301 (1940); Peterson, The Legislative Mandate of Sears and Compco:
A Plea for a Federal Law of Unfair Competition, 69 DIcK. L. REV. 347,
355-56 (1965); Comment, The Federal Law of Unfair Competition, 28
RocKy MT. L. REv. 111, 114-16 (1955).
8. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie, of course, held that a federal court
in a diversity case had to apply the substantive law of the state in which
the federal court was located.
9. Chafee, supra note 7, at 1299.
10. Kunin, The Lindsay Bill Before and After the Stifiel Case, 54
TRADEMARK REP. 731-32 (1964).
11. Diamond, The Proposed Federal Unfair Commercial Activities
Act, 23 Oino ST. L.J. 110, 113 (1962); Kunin, supra note 10, at 731-32.
12. Kunin, supra note 10, at 733-34.
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(5) all of these consequences are intolerable when visited
upon "national" or "multistate" business interests.' 3
Though often overdramatized, these charges are substantially
true.
Prior to Erie, the federal courts applied "general principles"
in the resolution of unfair trade practices claims both where fed-
eral jurisdiction was based on the diverse citizenship of the par-
ties, and where federal jurisdiction was based on the joinder of
an unfair trade practices claim with a substantially identical
claim under the federal patent, trademark, or copyright laws.14
Today, under Erie, state law must be applied in diversity cases.' 5
Perhaps, most importantly, many federal judges also feel con-
strained to apply state law in pendent jurisdiction cases.' 6 Con-
gressional legislation in the decades following Erie has restricted
the scope of diversity jurisdiction and increased the scope of
pendent jurisdiction.'7
It is also true that unfair trade practices decisions are often
few in number in states without large commercial centers.' 8
13. Diamond, supra note 11, at 115-16; Kunin, supra note 10, at
731-32.
14. E.g., Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.
1925), rev'd on other grounds, 273 U.S. 132 (1927) (diversity jurisdic-
tion); Vogue Co. v. Vogue Hat Co., 12 F.2d 991 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
273 U.S. 706 (1926) (alternative holding) (pendent jurisdiction). The
greater number of such pre-Erie federal cases involved diversity juris-
diction. The concept of pendent jurisdiction was initially rejected by
several circuits and did not receive the imprimatur of the United States
Supreme Court until 1933. Hun v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933). Erie,
of course, was decided only five years later.
15. E.g., Intermountain Broadcasting & Television Corp. v. Idaho
Microwave, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 315, 321-22 (D. Idaho 1961).
16. E.g., Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774,
780-81 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913 (1965). This is the pre-
vailing view, although the Supreme Court has not passed on the ques-
tion. See Kunin, supra note 10, at 733 & n.26. Contra, Bliss v. Gotham
Indus., Inc., 316 F.2d 848, 852-54 (9th Cir. 1963) (federal law applies).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1964) limits diversity jurisdiction by de-
claring that a corporation is a citizen of both the state where it has its
principal place of business and the state of incorporation; whereas 28
U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1964) expands pendent jurisdiction to include any
unfair trade practices claim which is joined with a substantial and re-
lated claim under the federal patent, trademark, or copyright laws. The
current American Law Institute study of federal jurisdiction proposes
further congressional inroads on diversity jurisdiction and further en-
hancement of pendent jurisdiction. ALI, STUDY OF =HE DnrIsioN or
JURISDIcTIoN BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL CouRTs 47-56 (Official Draft,
Pt. I 1965) (diversity jurisdiction); id. at § 1313 (Tent. Draft No. 3,
1965) (pendent jurisdiction).
18. E.g., 20 INDIANA LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA 10-21 (West 1959) & (Supp.
1965); 18 IowA DIGEST (West 1941) (Supp. 1966) (title: Trade Regula-
1967] 1007
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Yet, the undeveloped nature of state law has generally led state
and federal judges to refer to the pre-Erie federal common law
in order to fill doctrinal gaps in the state law.19 Judge Clark
once observed from his perspective as a federal circuit judge
that:
[T]he issue is really whether we shall apply our regurgitation
of the state redistillation of federal precedents or go more di-
rectly and realistically to the sources themselves. Actually, so
far as I can discover, we have never found any difference in
ultimate result, and so quite often lump federal and New York
law together .... 20
Thus, many of the federal decisions allegedly relegated to the
scrapheap by Erie remain vital sources of law today.
Moreover, the conflict-of-laws issues posed by multistate
unfair trade practices have been minimized by practical consid-
erations. Proponents of uniformity have contended that the tra-
ditional lex loci delicti choice-of-law rule requires mechanical
application by a forum applying state law2 ' of the law of every
state in which the plaintiff's interests have been adversely af-
fected by an unfair trade practice.2 2  However, Judge Wyzanski
articulated the pragmatic reaction of the courts to this conten-
tion when he responded that judges had "the robust common
tion); 22 NEW OREGON DIGEST (West 1961) & (Supp. 1966) (title: Trade
Regulation). Note that a number of the pertinent cases in these state
digests were decided by federal courts in the respective states.
19. E.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Sklar, 75 F. Supp. 98, 103 (E.D. Pa.
1947); Direct Serv. Oil Co. v. Honzay, 211 Minn. 361, 2 N.W.2d 434
(1941).
20. Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d
538, 545 (2d Cir. 1956) (concurring opinion).
21. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) held
that state conflict of laws rules were substantive under Erie and thus
had to be applied by federal courts in diversity cases. The Klaxon
doctrine is evaluated by Professor Cavers in ALl, op. cit. supra note 17,
at 154-214 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1963).
22. E.g., Diamond, The Federal Unfair Commercial Activities Act,
23 Omo ST. L.J. 110, 115-16 (1962), citing Ettore v. Philco Television
Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926
(1956). Ettore was a misappropriation-right of privacy case. See
PROSSER, TORTS § 112, at 839-42 (3d ed. 1964), which involved contacts in
four states, including the forum. The proposed Restatement of Conflict of
Laws (Second) repudiates the Ettore approach whether Ettore is regarded
as essentially a privacy or a misappropriation case. Under a privacy anal-
ysis, the Restatement (Second) favors application of the law of the plain-
tiff's domicile if publication also occurred there as it did in Ettore. RE-
STATEMENT (SECoND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379(h) (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1964). With respect to a misappropriation analysis, the Restatement pre-
fers reference to the law of the place where the defendant's misconduct
was principally situated. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws §
379, comment e (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964).
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sense to avoid writing opinions and entering decrees adapted
with academic nicety to the vagaries of forty-eight states. ' 23
Concern for the efficient administration of justice has impelled
the courts to focus primarily on the law of a single jurisdiction
in adjudicating the legality of multistate unfair trade practices.2 4
This approach can be faulted as giving undue significance
to the law of a single jurisdiction.25  However, the objection
loses much of its force if, as the embryonic Restatement of Con-
flict of Laws (Second) provides, the jurisdiction whose law is
applied is "the state which has the most significant relationship
with the occurrence and with the parties .... ,,211
A prime candidate for the state of most significant contacts is
the location of the defendant's principal place of business ger-
mane to the unfair trade practices;2 7 for example, the state from
which a defendant manufacturer sells goods bearing infringing
trade symbols to retailers in other states. Where a defendant's
tortious activity occurs with relative frequency in numerous
states, the state of most significant contacts may well be the loca-
tion of the plaintiff's principal place of business relevant to the
unfair trade practices; for example, where a defendant manufac-
turer sells goods with infringing trade symbols from places of
business in several different states, the state of most significant
contacts will often be the location of the principal office of plain-
tiff's business that is concerned with the sale of the product
whose trade symbol has been simulated.
28
The most serious issues raised by the standard case for uni-
formity concern the potential and actual existence of varying
23. National Fruit Prod. Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp.
499, 504 (D. Mass. 1942), aff'd on other grounds, 140 F.2d 618 (1st Cir.
1944).
24. Judge Wyzanski was describing the probable reaction of the
Massachusetts courts to the problem. However, his "no nonsense" view
has won widespread acceptance. E.g., Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexi-
tized Corp., 214 F. Supp. 664, 670-72 & n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd on
other grounds, 335 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913
(1965); Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179, 191-94 (D.
Del. 1960), aff'd, 313 F.2d 472 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 806 (1963);
see Note, Choice of Law in Multistate Unfair Competition, 60 HARV. L.
REv. 1315, 1317 & nn. 26-27 (1947).
25. 1A MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE § 0.326 (2d ed. 1965).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379(1) (Tent.
Draft No. 9, 1964). (Emphasis added.)
27. See id. § 379, comment e; Note, Choice of Law in Multistate
Unfair Competition, supra note 24, at 1318.
28. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CoNFLIcT OF LAWS §§ 379(e) (3),
379(f), 379(h), comment d (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964); Note, Choice of
Law in Multistate Unfair Competition, supra note 24, at 1318-21.
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state conceptions of unfair trade practices law. The problem is
largely potential with respect to torts like deceptive advertising
and false disparagement; there are relatively few litigated cases
because the stringent common law prerequisites for actionability
are seldom met.29 On the other hand, with respect to frequently
litigated torts like trade symbol infringement, there are actual
variances in the scope of protection. Some states, for example,
consider that competition between the parties30 and an intent
to deceive31 are prerequisites of common law trade symbol in-
fringement; whereas other states do not.32
There is undeniable validity in the proposition that "in multi-
state actions a complainant should be entitled to a single [opti-
mum] legal standard [of actionability] .... 33 If anything, the
proposition is too narrow. The citizens of the several states
are also entitled to optimum standards of actionability with re-
spect to unfair trade practices occurring in intrastate commerce.
The critical endeavor, of course, is to delineate the optimum
standards of actionability.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES LAW
Unfair trade practices law can be roughly subdivided into
groupings of legal rules dealing with the following types of
conduct: misuse of conventional business techniques; misap-
propriation of commercial intangibles; interference with con-
tractual relations; and conduct misleading the consumer or de-
ceptive trade practices.34 Most of these species of unfair trade
practices would materially benefit from revision by uniform
29. See, e.g., Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prods. Inc., 242
F. Supp. 302 (N.D. M. 1965).
30. E.g., Saperstein v. Grund, 85 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Iowa 1949);
Regent Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Haaker, 75 Neb. 426, 106 N.W. 595 (1906).
31. E.g., Straus Frank Co. v. Brown, 246 La. 999, 169 So. 2d 77(1964); Winston & Newell Co. v. Piggly Wiggly Northwest, Inc., 221
Minn. 287, 22 N.W.2d 11 (1946) (semble).
32. E.g., King's of Boise, Inc. v. M. H. King Co., 88 Idaho 267, 398
P.2d 942 (1965); Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co. v. A. & P. Trucking Corp.,
29 N.J. 455, 149 A.2d 595 (1959).
M 33. Comment, The Federal Law of Unfair Competition, 28 RocKy
MT. L. REV. 111, 115 (1955).
34. See Pattishall, The U.S.A. Courts and the Prevention of Unfair
Competition, 53 TRADEmARK REP. 599 (1963); Developments in the Law-
Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. REV. 888 (1964). Two other categories of
unfair trade practices encountered in the literature are private actions
implied from statutes providing public sanctions for commercial mis-
conduct, and private actions expressly authorized by statute. These
latter two categories, however, are nonsubstantive classifications which
overlap the substantive classifications of unfair trade practices law.
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legislation. The principal exception is the tort of intentional
interference with contractual relations, which is recognized "vir-
tually everywhere." 35
The regulation of improper uses of conventional business
techniques, like price cutting and refusals to deal, has been in-
creasingly subsumed under federal and state antitrust laws.36
This is a logical development. Given the traditional American
respect for competition, the most palpable abuse of conventional
business tactics is utilization of those tactics to subvert the com-
petitive process. Thus, in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 3 7
the Supreme Court held that a drug manufacturer violated the
Sherman Act by carrying out the avowed policy of refusing to
deal with wholesalers who traded with price-cutting retailers
that had been blacklisted by the manufacturer.
The misuse of conventional business methods is also the sub-
ject of a plethora of particularized legislation. The Federal Auto-
mobile Dealers' Day in Court Act, for example, forbids coercion
of automobile dealers by automobile manufacturers through un-
justified cancellation or nonrenewal of dealer franchises. 38
The sheer quantity of existing legislation dealing with misuse
of conventional business techniques indicates that a primary ob-
ject of uniform legislation in this area should be to integrate
and to simplify the rules-of-the-game currently established by
state and federal legislation. The proposed Uniform Antitrust
Act, for example, constitutes an effort to replace disparate
state laws with a uniform statute that is congruent with existing
federal legislation.39
The actionability of misappropriation of commercial intan-
gibles is a controversial and complex subject. The misappropri-
ation theory of unfair trade practices emerged full-blown in
International News Serv. v. Associated Press,40 in which a ma-
jority of the Supreme Court upheld an injunction against un-
authorized reproduction of uncopyrighted AP news dispatches
while the news was still fresh. Despite its lofty condemnation of
35. PROSSER, TORTS § 123, at 954 (3d ed. 1964).
36. Compare OPPENHEIM, UNr FA TRADE PRACTICES 23-24 (2d ed.
1965), with Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, supra note 34,
at 923-32.
37. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
38. §§ 1-5, 70 Stat. 1125-26 (1956), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1964).
See also OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 36, at 444-77 (state sales below
cost statutes).
39. See, e.g., Arnold & Ford, Uniform State Antitrust Act: Toward
Creation of a National Antitrust Policy, 15 W. REs. L. REV. 102 (1963).
40. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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appropriation to one's own advantage of what "equitably belongs
to a competitor,"41 the misappropriation theory has never gained
wholehearted judicial acceptance. Judge Wyzanski speculated
as long ago as 1942 that the theory no longer had the support
of a majority of the Supreme Court.4 2
The decidedly mixed judicial reaction to the misappropria-
tion theory is due to the theory's congenital vagueness. The
typical formulation of the misappropriation theory provides few
guidelines to courts, or to businessmen seeking to predict the
legality of their conduct. In the Ini;ernational News Serv. case,
the Supreme Court offered few indicia which distinguish action-
able misappropriation from healthy competition:
[D]efendant, by its very act, admits that it is taking material
that has been acquired by complainant as the result of organiza-
tion and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money, and which
is salable by complainant for money, and that defendant in ap-
propriating it and selling it as its own is endeavoring to reap
where it has not sown, and by disposing of it to newspapers that
are competitors of complainant's members is appropriating to
itself the harvest of those who have sown.43
To the extent that it is expedient to sanction the creation of
exclusive rights in commercial ideas, information, designs, and
artistic creations, blanket legislative endorsement of the mis-
appropriation theory is not the most desirable approach. Selec-
tive, specialized, and detailed legislative condemnation of "mis-
appropriation" is less potentially restrictive of socially useful
competition, if only because the precision of the legislative action
will discourage the assertion of exclusive rights not intended to
be validated by the legislature.44 The formulation of a Uniform
Trade Secrets Act, which articulates the subjects of trade secret
protection and the appropriate remedies for trade secret infringe-
ment, would, for example, constitute a profitable legislative ap-
proach to the misappropriation theory.
The epitome of a deceptive trade practice is conduct which
is misleading to consumers and consequently injurious to other
businessmen. Typical deceptive trade practices are trade symbol
41. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 532
(1935) (dictum).
42. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co.,
46 F. Supp. 198, 204 (D. Mass. 1942). See also Developments in the Law
-Competitive Torts, supra note 34, at 934-35.
43. International News Serv. v. AssDciated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-
40 (1918).
44. See Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, supra note
34, at 946-47.
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infringement, deceptive advertising, and false disparagement.45
Trade symbol infringement consists of the use of commercial
identification by one businessman which is likely to be confused
by purchasers with the commercial identification previously used
by another businessman. In Standard Oil Co. of New York v.
Standard Oil Co. of Maine,46 the long-established Standard Oil Co.
of New York was held to be entitled to enjoin the use of "Stand-
ard Oil Co." by a newly-organized corporation engaged in the
distribution of petroleum products in northern New England.
Deceptive advertising consists of the dissemination of false fac-
tual statements concerning the product, service, or business of
the disseminator. In Lower Main St. Merchants Ass'n v. Paul
Geller & Co.,47 competitors were declared to be entitled to an
injunction against a seemingly perpetual "going out of business
sale" by a retail men's clothing store. False disparagement con-
sists of the unprivileged publication of false, injurious statements
about the business, product, or service of another. Thus, Allen
Mfg. Co. v. Smith48 approved the issue of an injunction against
the distribution of spurious United States Department of Agri-
culture documents which falsely indicated that plaintiff's fly
spray had been condemned by the government.
In contradistinction to the mixed judicial reaction to the
misappropriation theory, the utility of general standards of ac-
tionability with respect to deceptive trade practices has been
repeatedly recognized. A 1925 Second Circuit opinion by Learned
Hand eloquently expounded this view. In Ely-Norris Safe Co. v.
Mosler Safe Co.,49 Judge Hand commented in dictum:
[T]here is no part of the law which is more plastic than unfair
competition, and what was not reckoned an actionable wrong 25
years ago may have become such today ... As we view it,
the question is, as it always is in such cases, one of fact. While
a competitor may, generally speaking, take away all the cus-
tomers of another that he can, there are means which he
must not use. One of these is deceit .... [W] e conceive that
in the end the questions which arise are always two: Has the
plaintiff in fact lost customers? And has he lost them by means
45. The tort of false disparagement is also known as injurious false-
hood and trade libel. Prosser, Injurious Falsehood: The Basis of Liabil-
ity, 59 COLUm. L. REv. 425 (1959).
46. 38 F.2d 677 (D. Maine), modified on other grounds, 45 F.2d 309
(Ist Cir. 1930). See DOLE, TERRITORIAL TRADEmARK RIGHTS AND THE AN=-
TRUST LAWS 4-11 (Michigan Legal Publications, 1965), for a general
discussion of common-law trade symbol protection.
47. 67 N.J. Super. 514, 171 A.2d 21 (1961).
48. 224 App. Div. 187, 229 N.Y. Supp. 692 (1928).
49. 7 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1925), rev'd on other grounds, 273 U.S. 132
(1927).
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which the law forbids? The false use of the plaintiff's name is
only an instance in which each element is clearly shown.50
Judge Hand's generalized condemnation of deceptive trade
practices is readily understandable. Consumer demand influ-
ences the allocation of resources in a free-market economy. If
consumer decisions are based on misinformation concerning the
products or services available, or concerning the businesses which
vend them, consumer demand may be deflected from efficient
businesses with superior products to firms less entitled to com-
mand an allocation of society's limited capital.51 Moreover, de-
ceptive trade practices adversely affect the individual interests of
both honest businessmen and consumers misled into buying pro-
ducts or services which do not adequately fulfill their needs. -52
Notwithstanding their deleterious consequences, the action-
ability of deceptive trade practices at common law is both non-
uniform and imperfect. Trade symbol infringement is a gener-
ally recognized tort, but there are material variances and gaps in
the scope of common law protection. Some states, for example,
consider that competition between the parties or an intent to
deceive is a prerequisite of relief, whereas others do not. 3
Moreover, many states have not passed on the actionability of
use of a trade symbol which falsely implies the existence of en-
dorsement, approval, or certification of a product, service, or
business by another business. This is a new concept of trade
symbol infringement, which is known as confusion of sponsor-
ship.54 In Consumers Union, Inc. v. Admiral Corp.,55 for instance,
the publisher of Consumer Reports was granted a preliminary in-
junction against advertising which incorrectly indicated that de-
fendant's 1960 air conditioners had been rated a "Best Buy" by
Consumer Reports.
With all its imperfections, the common law tort of trade
symbol infringement is infinitely more developed than the com-
mon law torts of deceptive advertising and false disparagement.
50. Id. at 604; accord, People v. National Research Co., 201 Cal. App.
2d 765, 20 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1962); see Bourjois, Inc. v. Park Drug Co., 82
F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1936); Electrolux Corp. v. Val-Worth, Inc., 6 N.Y.2d
556, 161 N.E.2d 197, 190 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1959).
51. BAw, INDusTRTAL ORGANIZATION 538 (1959).
52. Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. REV.
888, 892 (1964).
53. See notes 30-32 supra and accompanying text.
54. Comment, The Anti-Competitive Aspects of Trade Name Pro-
tection and the Policy Against Consumer Deception, 29 U. Cm. L. REv.
371, 373-74 (1962).
55. 186 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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As recently as 1961 a California intermediate appellate court
refused to acknowledge the actionability of deceptive advertising
at common law.5 6 Furthermore, the narrow holding of the "lib-
eral" Ely-Norris case was that deceptive advertising was not ac-
tionable without proof of special damage to the plaintiff, unless
the plaintiff was the sole producer of goods with the features
which the defendant falsely claimed for his own goods.57 The
common law actionability of false disparagement, though more
widely recognized, has been similarly restricted by a special
damage prerequisite. 58
Common law regulation of deceptive trade practices is con-
sequently a sometime affair. Trade symbol infringement is a
generally recognized tort and is generally actionable, though
there are actual variances in the scope of protection. On the
other hand, false disparagement is widely recognized as a tort
but is often not actionable; and deceptive advertising is not gen-
erally recognized as a tort and, even where it is tortious, is
generally not actionable.
After evaluation of the current status of unfair trade prac-
tices law, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws selected
deceptive trade practices as a primary subject for uniform legis-
lation. The lack of a nationwide optimum standard of action-
ability with respect to deceptive trade practices was deemed
intolerable in view of their injuriousness to honest businessmen
and consumers alike.5 9
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNIFORM ACT
Section 2 is the substantive core of the Uniform Act. Sec-
tion 2(a) provides:
A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the
course of his business, vocation, or occupation, he:
(1) passes off goods or services as those of another;
(2) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to
the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or
services;
56. Show Management v. Hearst Publishing Co., 196 Cal. App. 2d
606, 16 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1961).
57. See notes 49-50 supra and accompanying text.
58. E.g., Shaw Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Des Moines Dress Club,
215 Iowa 1130, 245 N.W. 231 (1932); Comment, Trade Disparagement and
the 'Special Damage' Quagmire, 18 U. CHi. L. REv. 114 (1950).
59. The other aspects of unfair trade practices law in need of
statutory revision were not neglected. Work was also begun on a Uni-
form Antitrust Act, and a Uniform Trade Secret Act was taken under
consideration. However, neither of these other statutes has been of-
ficially promulgated by the National Conference.
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(3) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to
affiliation, connection, or association with, or certification by,
another;
(4) uses deceptive representations or designations of geographic
origin in connection with goods or services;
(5) represents that goods or services have sponsorship, ap-
proval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities
that they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, ap-
proval, status, affiliation, or connection that he does not have;
(6) represents that goods are original or new if they are de-
teriorated, altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, used, or second-
hand;
(7) represents that goods or services are of a particular stand-
ard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or
model, if they are of another;
(8) disparages the goods, services, or business of another by
false or misleading representation of fact;
(9) advertises goods or services with intent not to sell them as
advertised;
(10) advertises goods or services with intent not to supply rea-
sonably expectable public demand, unless the advertisement dis-
closes a limitation of quantity;
(11) makes false or misleading statements of fact concerning
the reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions; or
(12) engages in any other conduct which similarly creates a
likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding. 60
Section 2(a) highlights certain types of deceptive advertis-
ing, false disparagement, and trade symbol infringement as spe-
cific deceptive trade practices and at the same time carries for-
ward the generalized condemnation of deceptive commercial con-
duct found in such pre-Erie federal cases as Judge Hand's Ely-
Norris decision.61 Sections 2(b) and 3(a) amplify the reach of
section 2(a) with declarations that evidence of competition be-
tween the parties, actual confusion or misunderstanding, intent
to deceive, or actual monetary damage are not prerequisites to
the grant of relief under the Uniform Act.
62
Sections 2(b) and 3 (a) do not preclude reference to any of
the enumerated factors as evidence that a plaintiff is likely to
60. UNIFoRm DECEPTEVE TRADE PRACiECES ACT § 2(a) (1) -(12) [here-
inafter cited as Ulrnomv ACT].
61. See notes 49-50 supra and accompanying text.
62. "In order to prevail in an action under this Act, a complainant
need not prove competition between the parties or actual confusion or
misunderstanding." Uxiroimv ACT § 2(b).
A person likely to be damaged by a deceptive trade practice
of another may be granted an injunction against it under the
principles of equity and on terms that the court considers rea-
sonable. Proof of monetary damage, loss of profits, or intent to
deceive is not required. ...
UNi oRm AcT § 3 (a).
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be damaged by a defendant's conduct. These sections simply
make clear that those factors are no more than evidence that the
plaintiff is apt to be damaged and that other evidence of probable
damage will also suffice. A wholesaler with an exclusive sales
agency for a trademarked beverage may, for example, be dam-
aged by repeated, false assertions by a retailer that the bever-
age distributed by the wholesaler is mislabeled, even though the
retailer is honestly mistaken about the truth of his claims.63
Section 2(c) relates the substantive provisions of the Uni-
form Act to other regulation of unfair trade practices. Section
2(c) states that the Uniform Act does not preempt the common-
law actionability of unfair trade practices, and does not impliedly
repeal state statutes dealing with unfair trade practices which are
not expressly repealed in conjunction with the enactment of the
Uniform Act.04
The Uniform Act authorizes injunctive relief against de-
ceptive trade practices 5 and preserves whatever other state rem-
edies exist for the same conduct.0 6 In addition, a court is given
discretion to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party if a
plaintiff has brought an action which he knew to be groundless,
or the party charged with a deceptive practice has willfully en-
gaged in the conduct knowing it to be deceptive. 67
There are several reasons for the omission of a damage rem-
edy from the Uniform Act. The ebb and flow of commerce in-
volves so many variables that the damages or profits caused by
a commercial tort are often difficult to prove.6 8 In situations
63. Cf. Goss v. Birnbaum Furniture Co., 21 Conn. Supp. 207, 151
A.2d 705 (Super. Ct. 1959); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Restaurant
Cherry Lane, Inc., 118 U.S.P.Q. 41 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958).
64. UNIFoM ACT § 2(c).
65. UNIroRM ACT § 3 (a).
66. UNiFoRM ACT § 3 (c).
67. UNIORm ACT § 3 (b). The original version of the Uniform Act
authorized a court to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party "in
exceptional cases" with the caveat that attorneys' fees could be assessed
against a defendant only if the court found that he had willfully en-
gaged in a deceptive trade practice. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , § 313
(1965). The "uniform interpretation" clause appended to the Uniform
Act should lead judges to interpret original § 3(b) in light of the 1966
amendment until conforming amendments are made. UNiFomV ACT § 5.
A strike suit under the act, for example, would certainly qualify as an
"exceptional case" meriting the award of attorneys' fees to the defendant
under the original language of § 3 (b), just as it does under the express
language of the § 3(b) amendment.
68. See, e.g., Arnold, A Federal Unfair Competition Law, 57 TRADE-
MIK REP. 116, 121 (1967); Kunin, Erieantompkinitis: The Malady and
its Cure, 1961 ABA PROcEEDiNGs 276, 281.
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where such proof is wholly lacking, the injunctive remedy au-
thorized by the Uniform Act is the only practicable remedy.
Thus, in Red Devil Tools v. Tip Top Brush Co.,69 the court af-
firmed an injunction against trade symbol infringement but re-
versed an accompanying accounting for profits in lieu of com-
pensatory damages because "there was no showing that any di-
rect or indirect injury had been caused by defendants to plain-
tiff's business or good will. 70
A damage remedy would also have been hard to reconcile
with the Uniform Act's dispensation with an intent to deceive as
an element of a deceptive trade practice. It is questionable
whether a judge would or should allow the recovery of ap-
proximate profits or damages unless the judge believes that a
defendant's professed innocence is more apparent than real.
7 1
Economic sanctions based on estimated damages or profits may
be justifiably used to punish and to deter deliberate tort-feasors.
An inadvertent tort-feasor should not be treated as cavalierly.
Moreover, damages are often recoverable at common law
with respect to deliberate deceptive trade practices.7 2  This
common law view is dovetailed with the Uniform Act by sec-
tion 3(c), which declares that the injunctive remedy provided
by the Act "is in addition to remedies otherwise available
against the same conduct ... .,,73 To the extent that the Uni-
form Act creates liability where not even deliberate conduct was
actionable at common law, section 3(c) also constitutes an invi-
tation to the courts to use the Uniform Act as a premise for
judicial reasoning in expanding the availability of economic
sanctions.74
69. 92 N.J. Super. 570, 224 A.2d 336 (App. Div. 1966).
70. Id. at 575, 224 A.2d at 339; accord, National Van Lines v. Dean,
237 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1956).
71. With respect to profits see, e.g., Wolfe v. National Lead Co.,
272 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 950 (1960). An Ac-
counting of Profits for Trade Symbol Infringement Based Upon a
Theory of Restitution, 54 TnADEmAI'K REP. 969, 979-81 & nn.73 & 74
(1964). With respect to damages see, e.g., Karsh v. Haiden, 120 Cal.
App. 2d 75, 260 P.2d 633 (1953); Comment, Monetary Awards for Unfair
Competition in California, 34 So. CAL. L. REV. 283, 309-10 (1961).
72. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 745, 747 (1938). Compare Ojala v.
Bohlin, 178 Cal. App. 2d 292, 2 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1960), with Wood v.
Peffer, 55 Cal. App. 2d 116, 130 P.2d 220 (1942).
73. UNmomw ACT § 3 (c).
74. Cf. Wood v. Peffer, 55 Cal. App. 2d 116, 130 P.2d 220 (1942), in
which the court indicated that defendant's profits could be recovered
where warranted in an action under CAL. Civ. CODE § 3369, a statute
analogous to the Uniform Act, which authorizes an injunctive, but not
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Although there are several statutes which reflect aspects of
the Uniform Act, a 1933 California statute7 5 and section 43 (a) of
the Federal Lanham Trademark Act of 194676 constitute rough
prototypes. Section 43(a) declares deceptive advertising and
misleading trade identification of goods and services, a form of
trade symbol infringement, actionable at the suit of any person
"who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged .... "7 In-
tention to deceive is not a prerequisite to relief.78 The Uniform
Act, of course, also possesses these substantive attributes. In-
deed, the Uniform Act has broader substantive coverage than
section 43(a), which does not reach disparagement 9 or mislead-
ing identification of businesses. 0
Section 43 (a) does not contain remedial provisions, and the
general remedial provisions of the Lanham Act are expressly
confined to redressing infringement of rights in federally regis-
tered trade symbols.8' Nevertheless, where economic loss can be
established to flow from a section 43 (a) violation that does not
involve registered trade symbol infringement, the courts have
analogized the availability of both injunctive and damage reme-
dies from the general remedial provisions of the Lanham Act.8 2
a damage remedy. See generally Note, The Uniform Commercial Code
as a Premise for Judicial Reasoning, 65 COLum. L. REV. 880 (1965).
75. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369, as amended, (Supp. 1966).
76. 60 Stat. 441 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1964). Section 3 of
the federal trademark act of 1920 was the precursor of § 43 (a). Act of
March 19, 1920, ch. 104, § 3, 41 Stat. 534 (1920). Section 3, however, was
substantially a dead letter from the moment of enactment. Derenberg,
Federal Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First Decade of the
Lanham Act, 32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1029, 1034-35 (1957).
77. 60 Stat. 441 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1964). See, e.g., Fed-
eral-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1963)
(product simulation); L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214
F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954) (deceptive advertising).
78. E.g., Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641,
648 (3d Cir. 1958).
79. See Glenn v. Advertising Publications, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 889
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 242
F. Supp. 302, 310 (N.D. fll. 1965); Derenberg, supra note 76, at 1039.
Compare Umroumvr ACT § 2(a) (8).
80. Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218 (D.
Mass. 1949) (alternative holding), aff'd mem., 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir.
1950). Compare UNiro~m ACT § 2(a) (3).
81. Lanham Act § 34, 60 Stat. 439 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1964);
Lanham Act § 35, 60 Stat. 439 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1117
(1964).
82. See L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 115 U.S.P.Q. 235
(E.D. Pa. 1957); Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 940 (D.D.C.
1955), affd per curiam sub nom., S. C. Johnson & Son v. Gold Seal Co.,
230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956). It has pre-
viously been suggested that a damage remedy could be analogized from
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California Civil Code Section 3369, the other principal fore-
runner of the Uniform Act, provides in pari materia:
2. Any person performing or proposing to perform an act of
unfair competition within this State may be enjoined in any
court of competent jurisdiction.
3. As used in this section, unfair competition shall mean and
include unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practice, and
unfair, untrue, or misleading advertising and any act denounced
by Business and Professions Code . .. Sections 17500 to 17535,
inclusive. [The sections of the Business and Professions Code
referred to deal exclusively with deceptive advertising.] 8 3
Judicial interpretations of section 3369 parallel numerous as-
pects of the Uniform Act: likelihood of confusion of sponsor-
ship is actionable;8 4 the statute does not contain a restrictive or
exclusive definition of deceptive trade practices;8 5 competition
between the parties is not an invariable condition of relief;0
a defendant need not be an intentional wrongdoer to be subject to
an injunction;8 7 proof of actual monetary damage is not neces-
sary to obtain an injunction; 8 the statute provides exclusively
for injunctive relief through damages or a defendant's profits
may be recovered where otherwise permitted by law; 89 finally,
attorneys' fees have been allowed a successful plaintiff where a
defendant's violation of the statute was deliberate 0
the Uniform Act in this fashion. See note 74 supra and accompanying
text.
83. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3369, as amended, (Supp. 1966).
84. See Academy of Motion Pictura Arts & Sciences v. Benson, 15
Cal. 2d 685, 104 P.2d 650 (1940).
85. Athens Lodge No. 70 v. Wilson, 117 Cal. App. 2d 322, 255 P.2d
482 (1953).
86. Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Benson, 15 Cal.
2d 685, 104 P.2d 650 (1940).
87. Visser v. Macres, 214 Cal. App. 2d 249, 29 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1963);
Hair v. McGuire, 188 Cal. App. 2d 348, 355, 10 Cal. Rptr. 414, 417-18
(1961).
88. MacSweeney Enterprises, Inc. v. Tarantino, 235 Cal. App. 2d
549, 561, 45 Cal. Rptr. 546, 554 (1965).
89. See, e.g., Hesse v. Grossman, 152 Cal. App. 2d 536, 313 P.2d 625
(1957).
90. National Van Lines v. Dean, 237 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1956). The
federal courts of late have been allowing attorneys' fees as an element
of damages in unfair trade practice cases. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND),
TORTS § 746A (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963). The Supreme Court, however,
has recently reacted to perfunctory allowance of substantial sums as at-
torneys' fees by holding that attorneys' fees cannot be awarded in actions
under the Federal Trademark Act of 1946. Fleischman Distilling Corp. v.
Maier Brewing Co., 35 U.S.L. WEEK 4393 (U.S. May 8, 1967). The ques-
tion of the continued validity of National Van, which awarded attorneys'
fees in an action under § 3369, was expressly left open in Fleischman.
359 F.2d 156, 165 (9th Cir. 1966), aff'd on other grounds, 35 U.S.L. WEEK
4393 (U.S. May 8, 1967).
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This sketch of section 43(a) and California Civil Code Sec-
tion 3369 illustrates that most of the basic elements of the Uni-
form Act were derived from prior legislative and judicial ex-
perience. However, a marked distinction between the Uniform
Act and its antecedents is the former's inclusion of an enumera-
tion of specific deceptive trade practices with a general ban on
deceptive trade practices.
This should prove to be a significant difference. Several
commentators have deplored the relative desuetude of section
43(a) without taking note of the generality of section 43(a)'s
terminology as a possible defect.0 1 The California Supreme Court
has remarked in construing section 3369 that:
The phrase "unfair competition" when carrried beyond its tradi-
tional scope in equitable actions ... does not have a fixed
meaning in the absence of statutory definition. Courts of equity,
therefore, are loath to enjoin conduct on that ground in the ab-
sence of specific authorization therefor.92
IV. THE UNIFORM ACT IN THE CONTEXT OF EXISTING
STATE LEGISLATION
Professor Handler has pinpointed at least seventeen differ-
ent types of state legislation relevant to unfair trade practices.0 3
The following discussion will stress those statutes which are
most apt to be confused with the Uniform Act.
The Uniform Act imposes few restraints on pricing prac-
tices and differs markedly from the various "fair trade acts,"
"unfair sales acts," and "unfair discrimination acts" which for-
bid certain types of price competition. 94 "Fair trade acts" au-
thorize sellers of trademarked merchandise to make contracts
fixing the minimum or stipulated prices at which the mer-
91. E.g., Derenberg, supra note 76, at 1039-55; Well, Protectibility
of Trademark Values Against False Competitive Advertising, 44 CALIF.
L. REv. 527 (1956).
92. International Ass'n of Cleaning & Dye House Workers v. Land-
owitz, 20 Cal. 2d 418, 422, 126 P.2d 609, 611 (1942) (dictum). (Emphasis
added.)
93. Handier, Unfair Competition, 21 IowA L. REv. 175, 229-36 (1936).
The Uniform Act, it will be recalled, does not impliedly repeal state stat-
utes dealing with unfair trade practices which are not expressly re-
pealed in conjunction with enactment of the act. UNiFomv ACT § 2(c).
94. The precise titles of these statutes often differ from state to
state so that they can be reliably identified only by their substantive
provisions. Nevertheless, the titles mentioned are typical and illustrate
the legislative ploy of invoking the epithet "unfair" to justify virtually
every kind of statute regulating commercial activities. See Wi.cox,
CoMPETITIoN AND MoNOPOLY In A!VIERIcAN INDusTRY 6-7 (TNEC Mono-
graph No. 21, 1940).
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chandise can be resold by distributors and dealers.95 Selling
below the prices set by fair trade contracts is usually declared
to be "unfair competition" which is actionable by "any person
damaged." 96 "Unfair sales acts" prohibit sales below cost made
with the intention of injuring competition or competitors, 7 and
"unfair discrimination acts" condemn sale of the same goods at
different prices in various areas of a state in order to injure
competition or to promote a monopoly.98 Violation of "unfair
sales acts" and "unfair discrimination acts," which may be com-
bined in an omnibus "unfair trade practices act," is often both a
crime and actionable by "any person."99
The Uniform Act has little or no common ground with
these state statutes constricting price competition. "Unfair sales
acts," which interdict certain sales below cost, have been de-
fended as precluding use of loss leaders to create a false impres-
sion that an advertised bargain is representative of a seller's
prices; 1°0 but, this is a disingenuous rationale. If the primary
legislative concern is with deceptive trade practices, these can be
forbidden without stifling price competition.110 The Uniform
95. OPPENHEiW, UNFAm TRADE PRACnCEs 405-06 (2d ed. 1965). State
fair-trade legislation, which would otherwise be preempted by the fed-
eral antitrust laws or the commerce clause of the Constitution, is ex-
pressly validated insofar as vertical price-fixing agreements are con-
cerned by the Miller-Tydings amendment to § 1 of the Sherman Act, 50
Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), and the McGuire amendment to
§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 66 Stat. 631 (1952), 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (a) (2)- (5) (1964).
96. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Telco Supply, Inc., 84 Ariz. 132,
134, 325 P.2d 394, 395 (1958) (suit by a manufacturer who had a fair
trade program).
97. See, e.g., Dikeou v. Food Distribs. Ass'n, 107 Colo. 38, 108 P.2d
529 (1940); LaRue, Pitfalls for Price Competitors: State and Federal
Restrictions on Below Cost or Unreasonably Low Prices, 15 W. REs. L.
REV. 35, 38 (1963).
98. See, e.g., Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157
(1912) (South Dakota statute).
99. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-101; Mering v. Yolo Gro-
cery & Meat Mkt., 127 P.2d 985 (Cal. App. 1942) (neither special dam-
age nor injury necessary to obtain an injunction against violation).
100. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 10235 Before a Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. 49 (1960). The Pennsylvania Unfair Sales Act, for instance, spe-
cifically forbids use of sales below cost "with the result of deceiving any
purchaser or prospective purchaser . . . ." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 213
(1960).
101. See LaRue, supra note 97, at 62-63. LaRue also dismisses the
argument that a loss-leader operation deceives consumers as to the
quality of goods and services offered by the discount operator. It is
admittedly difficult to see how the mere use of loss leaders will mislead
consumers as to the quality of goods or services. Moreover, if collateral
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Act, for example, condemns false assertions of the existence of,
or amounts of price cuts, 10 2 and advertisement of loss leaders
with an intent to switch all or most prospects to unadvertised,
higher-priced items, 10 3 but price cutting in and of itself is not
made a specific deceptive trade practice. Thus, mere price cut-
ting does not fall within the general language of section 2(a)
(12), for that subsection follows section 2(a)'s enumeration of
particular deceptive trade practices and only proscribes conduct
"which similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or of mis-
understanding."'1 4  Moreover, because section 3(a) authorizes
injunctions solely against "deceptive trade practices,"'0 5 an in-
junction under the act should not forbid the use or advertise-
ment of price cuts in the absence of a deceptive scheme.
Most states have "weights, measures, and labeling acts,"
"food, drug, and cosmetic acts," and "insecticide, fungicide, and
rodenticide acts" which are enforced by state administrative agen-
cies. 00  These statutes perform similar functions. "Weights,
measures, and labeling acts" set general standards for the pack-
aging and labeling of packaged articles; whereas "food, drug,
and cosmetic acts" and "insecticide, fungicide, and rodenticide
acts" require higher standards for the packaging and labeling of
the limited classes of products within their purview. Any or
all of these statutes may also set standards for advertising. 0 7
misrepresentations concerning the quality of a seller's goods or services
are present in a particular case, these misrepresentations should be
subject to suppression without affecting his pricing policies.
102. Uxiomv ACT § 2(a) (11).
103. UNiroiul ACT § 2(a) (9)-(10).
104. UNiro~m ACT § 2(a) (12). (Emphasis added.) To the extent
that there is any room for doubt as to the interpretation of § 2(a) (12) in
this regard, the fact that price competition was generally nonactionable
at common law, see, e.g., Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946
(1909), and the social interest in competition should further indicate
to the courts that the legislature did not intend price cutting and loss-
leaders to be within the general language of § 2(a) (12). Cf. Interna-
tional Ass'n of Cleaning & Dye House Workers v. Landowitz, 20 Cal. 2d
418, 126 P.2d 609 (1942) (general statute condemning unfair competition
construed not to forbid price cutting). The elaborate provisions of the
statutes which overtly regulate price competition are additional evidence
that the terse language of § 2(a) (12) was not meant to apply to the
complex problem of price regulation.
105. UNIFoRm ACT § 3(a).
106. RETAILERS' MANUAL or TAXEs & REGULATIONS 226-38, 195-225,
250-58 (16th ed. 1963).
107. E.g., DEL. CODE ANm. tit. 6, § 5125 (Supp. 1966) (Delaware
weights and measures statute prohibits price misrepresentation); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 54-1-3(e) (1953) (New Mexico food act bans false adver-
tising of products within its ambit); INx. STAT. ANx. § 15-2408 (a) (1964)
(Indiana herbicide statute condemns false or misleading advertising of
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Because of its obvious impact on interstate commercial transac-
tions, this type of state legislation is subject to gradual displace-
ment by new federal legal controls'08 and to the prospect of
eventual overall preemption. 10 9
The Uniform Act's ban on deceptive trade practices may
parallel the deceptive advertising jurisdiction of state agencies
charged with administration of "weights, measures, and labeling
acts," "food, drug, and cosmetic acts," and "insecticide, fungicide,
and rodenticide acts," as well as the jurisdiction of other state"10
and federal"' agencies with similar powers. Moreover, inas-
much as product simulation-including simulation of labels and
containers-is a well-established deceptive trade practice,1"2 there
is also a potential for conflict between the Uniform Act and
state and federal administrative regulation of packaging and
labeling. However, friction is precluded on both counts by sec-
tion 4 (a) (1) of the Uniform Act, which states that the act does
not apply to "conduct in compliance with the orders or rules of,
or a statute administered by, a federal, state, or local govern-
mental agency."1 3
Section 4(a) (1) does more than harmonize the Uniform
Act with state and federal administrative regulation of deceptive
trade practices. 1 4 The exemption from actionability of only
herbicides.). On the state level, these statutes illustrate Professor
Braucher's observation that the job of controlling unfair trade practices
is being increasingly delegated to administrative agencies. Braucher,
American Administrative Activity in the Field of Unfair Competition, 15
FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 423 (1960).
108. E.g., Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 80 Stat. 1296 (1966), 15
U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (Supp. II 1967).
109. See Engdahl, Consolidation by Compact: A Remedy for Pre-
emption of State Food and Drug Laws, 14 J. PUB. L. 276 (1965).
110. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 28, ch. 3A (1958), which gives the state
superintendent of insurance jurisdiction over unfair methods of compe-
tition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the insurance business.
111. State food, drug, and cosmetic acts, and insecticide, fungicide,
and rodenticide acts, for example, are based on federal prototypes. Fed-
eral Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), as amended,
21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1964); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenti-
cide Act, 61 Stat. 163 (1947), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135(k) (1964).
112. E.g., H. E. Winterton Gum Co. v. Autosales Gum & Chocolate
Co., 211 Fed. 612 (6th Cir. 1914); Pattishall, The U.S.A. Courts and the
Prevention of Unfair Competition, 53 TaUIDEmARK REP. 599, 606-07 (1963).
113. UromRV ACT § 4(a) (1). See also UNFoR ACT § 3(c) which
states that relief under the act "is in addition to remedies otherwise
available against the same conduct under the common law or other
statutes of this state." Section 3(c) precludes an argument that the
Uniform Act impliedly repeals the deceptive advertising jurisdiction of
state administrative agencies.
114. For a discussion of the limited extent to which the Uniform
Act is preempted by federal law see Dole, Merchant and Consumer Pro-
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conduct which complies with administrative standards suggests
that a competent administrative standard with respect to imper-
missible deception can serve as evidence of what is "conduct
which similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunder-
standing" under section 2(a) (12). Thus, a Federal Trade Com-
mission determination that the use of bogus governmental forms
in order to obtain information concerning debtors constituted un-
lawful deception under the Federal Trade Commission Act could
induce a court to condemn similar conduct under section 2(a)
(12),11r, as long as the doctrine of primary jurisdiction did not
require judicial deference to administrative evaluation of such
conduct.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction allocates priority of
jurisdiction between courts and administrative agencies. Where
the doctrine is applied, administrative action must precede judi-
cial action.116 The application of the doctrine of primary juris-
diction to an administrative agency's jurisdiction over deceptive
trade practices would accordingly preclude use of section 2(a)
(12) as a surrogate for administrative regulation.
A determination that the label or advertising of an economic
poison or a food, drug, or cosmetic is or is not deceptive can
involve considerable expertise. Moreover, state and federal "in-
secticide, fungicide, and rodenticide" and "food, drug, and cos-
metic" acts constitute intermeshed statutory schemes that re-
quire affirmative disclosures as well as avoidance of overt de-
ception. Both circumstances suggest that the doctrine of pri-
mary jurisdiction should be applied to complex issues arising un-
der these statutes.117 Nevertheless, the doctrine need not be in-
voked with respect to uncomplicated issues concerning the sub-
jects regulated by these statutes, such as whether or not a
medicine or an economic poison bears an infringing trade symbol
or has a package-format which is confusingly similar to another
manufacturer's package-format."18
State "weights, measures, and labeling" laws typically con-
tection: The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 76 YALE L.J. 485,
501-06 (1967).
115. Cf. People v. National Research Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 20
Cal. Rptr. 516 (1962); Mindell, The New York Bureau of Consumer
Frauds and Protection-A Review of Its Consumer Protection Activities,
11 N.Y.L.F. 603, 612-13 (1965).
116. 3 DAVIs, ADiNISTRATIVE LAW § 19.01 (1958).
117. 2 COOPER, STATE ADMINIsTRATIVE LAw 563-64 (1965); Jaffee,
Primary Jurisdiction, 77 -IARv. L. REV. 1037, 1040-41 (1964).
118. See Bristol-Myers Co. v. Approved Pharmaceutical Corp., 149
U.S.P.Q. 896 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
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tain relatively clear-cut requirements which do not necessitate
much sophistication to apply. There is, therefore, no need to
invoke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction with respect to these
statutes in the absence of a legislative command to do so.
The Federal Trade Commission and its few state counter-
parts" 9 are the administrative agencies whose deceptive trade
practice jurisdiction most nearly coequals the entire Uniform Act.
Application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction with respect
to these agencies would eviscerate the Uniform Act; but, there
is slight prospect of this occurring. Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, for example, contains a terse prohibition
on deceptive conduct which adversely affects the public. 20
There is no complex regulatory scheme dealing with a spe-
cialized subject matter and no administrative jurisdiction what-
soever over deceptive conduct which is primarily injurious to
individual businessmen or consumers. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction is thus not only uncalled for with respect to the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act; 12 1 invocation of the doctrine would
materially and unnecessarily abridge private legal controls over
deceptive trade practices. 22  Actions under the Uniform Act
should be privileged to trespass on the statutory domain of the
Federal Trade Commission and similar state agencies, and the
courts should be able to use section 2 (a) (12) in their already
discernible assimilation of well-established FTC precedents into
the law of deceptive trade practices. 1 23
Reference to the Uniform Act's relationship to the Federal
Fair Packaging and Labeling Act of 1966 is in order before leav-
ing the subject of the interplay between the Uniform Act and
administrative regulation of packaging, labeling, and advertising.
Effective July 1, 1967, the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act re-
quires the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and the
Federal Trade Commission to promulgate regulations specifying
information that must appear on the labels of "consumer com-
modities" in order to facilitate value comparisons by consum-
ers. 24  These authorities are given discretionary authority to
119. E.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 100.18-.20 (1957), as amended, (Supp.
1967).
120. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a) (1), (b)
(1964).
121. Jaffee, supra note 117, at 1040-41.
122. Cf. Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HARv. L.
REV. 987, 1000 (1949).
123. See Weston, Deceptive Advertising and the Federal Trade Com-
mission: Decline of Caveat Emptor, 24 FED. B.J. 548, 557 (1964).
124. Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 80 Stat. 1296 (1966), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1451-61 (Supp. II 1967). "Consumer commodities" are defined to in-
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promulgate additional regulations concerning characterization of
the size of a package, representations that a sale is at other than
the customary retail price, disclosure of product ingredients,
and nonfunctional slack-fill of packages, if the regulations in-
itially required by the statute prove inadequate.125  The Secre-
tary of Commerce is also empowered to encourage voluntary
industry product standardization where he finds "undue prolifer-
ation" in package quantities, weights, or measures. 2 6
The Fair Packaging and Labeling Act was often referred to
as the "truth-in-packaging" bill during its slow progress through
Congress. 121 As this nickname implies, the legislation is primar-
ily intended to create meaningful standards of product compari-
son where none exist, and not merely to curb representations
which are deceptive in light of existing standards of product
comparison. Thus, the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act bans
use of terms like "giant" in connection with descriptions of net
package contents where such terms "exaggerate the amount of
the commodity contained in the package."' 28  On the other hand,
section 2 (a) (12) of the Uniform Act, like section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, proscribes conduct which is deceptive
in view of existing marketplace standards. 29  Measured by this
yardstick, a lack of meaningful trade standards with respect to
a particular representation, for example, a beverage billed as a
"giant quart," could lead to a conclusion that there is no "like-
lihood of confusion or of misunderstanding" arising from use of
the term as long as the product contains more than thirty-two
fluid ounces. 30 The same analysis applies to section 2(a) (5)'s
clude most goods sold to individual consumers at retail with the exception
of meat, poultry, and tobacco products; insecticides, fungicides, and ro-
denticides; drugs, alcoholic beverages, and seeds. § 10(a), 80 Stat. 1301(1966), 15 U.S.C. § 1459(a) (Supp. II 1967).
125. § 5(c), 80 Stat. 1298 (1966), 15 U.S.C. § 1454(c) (Supp. II 1967).
126. Id. at § 5(d), 80 Stat. 1298 (1966), 15 U.S.C. § 1454(d) (Supp. II
1967).
127. Hart, Can Federal Legislation Affecting Consumers' Economic
Interests Be Enacted?, 64 MIc H. L. REv. 1255, 1256 & n.10 (1966).
128. § 4(b), 80 Stat. 1297 (1966), 15 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (Supp. II 1967).
129. Cf. Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 818 (1950); Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission and False
Advertising, 64 CoLum. L. REV. 439, 489-90 (1964). As an administra-
tive agency the FTC may, however, be able to utilize its rulemaking
power to create standards, or at least to create trade concensus on stand-
ards. See generally Forte, The Food and Drug Administration, the
Federal Trade Commission and the Deceptive Packaging of Foods, 40
N.Y.U.L. REv. 860, 879-87 (1965). The Uniform Act, of course, creates
neither an administrative agency nor rulemaking power.
130. Cf. California Apparel Creators v. Wieder, Inc., 162 F.2d 893 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 816 (1947).
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ban on representations that goods have "quantities that they do
not have."
It is just as well that the Uniform Act is not comparable to
the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act of 1966. Section 12 of that
Act expressly preempts
all laws of the States . . . [which] provide for the labeling of
the net quantity of contents of the package of any consumer
commodity covered by this Act which are less stringent than or
require information different from the requirements of section
4 of this Act or regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.131
Note, however, that section 12 does not preempt state law which
coincides with the packaging and labeling standards evolved un-
der the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act. This permits applica-
tion of those standards under section 2 (a) (12) as tests for pack-
aging and labeling practices which create "a likelihood of con-
fusion or of misunderstanding" as soon as the Fair Packaging
and Labeling Act standards have crystallized the commercial
meaning of terms like "giant quart."
The final class of legislation to be compared with the Uni-
form Act is extant legislation dealing with trade symbol pro-
tection and deceptive advertising. Most states have trademark
registration statutes which supplement common law trademark
protection through provisions for evidentiary advantages and
additional private remedies; for example, a court order requiring
the destruction of all infringing material. 32 The Uniform Act,
like state trademark registration statutes, supplements common
law protection of trademarks.133  However, unlike many state
trademark registration statutes, the Uniform Act applies to mis-
leading trade symbols used to distinguish services and businesses
as well as to misleading trade symbols used to distinguish goods
(trademarks) .134 Moreover, also unlike the typical trademark
131. § 12, 80 Stat. 1302 (1966), 15 U.S.C. § 1461 (Supp. II 1967).
132. E.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 360-68 (Supp. 1966); Note, Statu-
tory Treatment of the Model State Trademark Bill in the Areas of Serv-
ice Marks and Conflicting Federal Registrations, 27 GEO. WAsH. L. REv.
353, 354-56 (1959).
133. UNIFoRm AcT §2 2(a) (2), 2(a) (3), 2(b), 2(c).
134. UmFom ACT §2 2(a) (2), 2(a) (3). In modern parlance, a
trade symbol used to distinguish a business, e.g., Campbell Soup Co., is
a trade name; a trade symbol used to distinguish services, e.g., "Fastest
Press in Town" is a service mark; and a trade symbol used to distinguish
goods, e.g., a "Whamo" baseball bat. is a trademark. Many state
statutes limit the privilege of registration to trademarks--though an
increasing number include service marks, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§
360a-ii, 362 (Supp. 1966). Trade names are generally not registrable.
See Dole, The Proposed Trade Names Registration Act, 56 TRmADE mK
REP. 91-92 (1966).
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registration statute, the Uniform Act modifies the substantive
law applicable to use of misleading trade symbols by expressly
condemning conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion as
to sponsorship, approval, or certification,135 and by explicitly dis-
pensing with proof of competition between the parties, 136 and
intent to deceive 3 7 as inflexible prerequisites of relief.
Most states have a general statute forbidding deceptive ad-
vertising as well as a number of specific statutes forbidding
deceptive advertising of particular products. 38 The older legis-
lation is characterized by criminal sanctions and has seldom been
enforced. 3  More recently, state attorneys general 40 and a few
state administrative agencies14 have been given power to enjoin
deceptive advertising, and, though less frequently, the author-
ity to recover a civil penalty. These deceptive advertising stat-
utes with public remedies may reach conduct covered by the
Uniform Act, but do not duplicate the function of the Uniform
Act.
The effectiveness of any public remedy for deceptive adver-
tising is necessarily conditioned by the budget and personnel
available to implement the remedy.142 Moreover, proceedings by
state officials are usually confined to deceptive advertising which
materially affects the public or is outrageously flagrant. Thus,
there remains ample need for a correlative private action by
persons apt to suffer pecuniary loss from garden-variety decep-
tive advertising. 43 As a matter of fact, state officials should be
135. UNiFoRm ACT §§ 2(a) (2), 2(a) (3). The adoption of a confu-
sion of sponsorship test for trade symbol infringement is expressly made
nonretroactive. UNo OmVu AcT § 4(b).
136. UN rFomv ACT § 2(b).
137. U TFOm ACT § 3 (a).
138. E.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-901 to -908 (1964) (deceptive
advertising of antifreeze); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 39-1910 (1955), as amended,
(Supp. 1966) (general statute).
139. Note, Regulation of Advertising, 56 CoLum. L. R.v. 1018, 1058-65
(1956).
140. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-8-1 to -8-14 (1964), as amended,
(Supp. 1966); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 350 (a)- (e) (Supp. 1966); Develop-
ments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1124-32
(1967).
141. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 100.18-.20 (1957), as amended, (Supp.
1967); see also Note, Antitrust and Unfair Trade Practice Regulation in
Utah, 8 UTAH L. REv. 339, 342-45 (1964).
142. See, e.g., Note, Antitrust and Unfair Trade Practice Regulation
in Utah, supra note 141, at 347-49.
143. See Weston, Deceptive Advertising and the Federal Trade Com-
mission: Decline of Caveat Emptor, 24 FED. B.J. 548, 575 (1964), recom-
mending enactment of both new state public remedies against deceptive
advertising and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
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grateful if an adversely affected businessman is willing to insti-
tute legal proceedings under the Uniform Act against deceptive
advertising which does materially affect the public: "There is
no real reason to require... [the expenditure of] public money
to proceed against trade liars if private competitors are willing
to take on the job."'144
Finally, there are a number of state statutes which provide
private remedies for some of the deceptive advertising pro-
scribed by the Uniform Act.1 45 This legislation does duplicate
portions of the Uniform Act and should be repealed in conjunc-
tion with enactment of the Uniform Act unless it offers different
remedies. The few state statutes which authorize a damage rem-
edy for deceptive advertising or allow consumers to rescind
sales of deceptively advertised goods, for example, should not
be repealed. 4 However, even California Civil Code Section 3369,
one of the prototypes of the Uniform Act, should be amended
so as to add the Uniform Act's specific deceptive trade practices
to section 3369's present generalized condemnation of commer-
cial deception.
The foregoing analysis indicates that there are few state
statutes which are comparable to the Uniform Act. The act is
neither substantively analogous to the bevy of state laws pro-
viding private remedies with respect to price competition, nor
substantively identical with either trademark registration stat-
utes or the few state statutes authorizing rescission and a dam-
age recovery for limited types of deceptive advertising. Fur-
thermore, because of the advantages of utilizing both public and
private remedies with respect to deceptive conduct which does
not require application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
state statutes providing public remedies for deceptive advertising,
labeling, and packaging are complemented rather than dupli-
cated by the Uniform Act. Indeed, both state and federal stat-
utes providing public remedies for conduct which runs afoul
of the Uniform Act are potential sources of standards which can
be utilized in the application of section 2(a) (12)'s denunciation
of "conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or
of misunderstanding."
144. Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HARv. L.
REV. 987, 1000 (1949).
145. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. ch. 106-5 (Supp. 1966), which includes bait
advertising, misrepresentations as to the true ownership of a business
during a sale, false claims that a sale is at wholesale, and a general
provision.
146. ICH. STAT. ANN. § 28-79(1)-(10) (1962), as amended, (Supp.
1965); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 69-601 to -607 (Supp. 1966).
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V. THE FORSEEABLE IMPACT OF THE UNIFORM ACT
The potential contributions of the Uniform Act to the law of
unfair trade practices are threefold: a nationwide standard of
actionability with respect to deceptive trade practices; an im-
proved private remedy with respect to deceptive trade practices;
and an increased incentive for the absorption of Federal Trade
Commission precedents into the law of deceptive trade practices.
Although deceptive trade practices have been actionable in
principle for some time, the bulk of the reported cases in which
relief has been granted involve trade symbol infringement. 147
Private actions for deceptive advertising and false disparagement
have been hobbled with unrealistic prerequisites. Under the
leading case of Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co.,1 48 decep-
tive advertising is not actionable, in the absence of direct proof
of special damage, unless the plaintiff's goods are the only goods
on the market which contain the features which the defendant
falsely claims for his own goods. Similarly, in some states false
disparagement is not actionable unless the plaintiff can aver
the names of specific customers whom he has lost because of
the defendant's conduct.149  Even those "liberal" jurisdictions
which permit an action for disparagement to be grounded upon a
general loss of business following the publication of deprecating
false statements require difficult-to-obtain evidence that the gen-
eral loss of business was causally linked to the derogatory state-
ments. , 0
The stringent common law prerequisites to the recovery of
damages caused by deceptive advertising and false disparagement
are understandable safeguards against unwarranted imposition
of damage liability, though, even with respect to damage lia-
bility, mechanical application of these prerequisites has resulted
in summary dismissal of seemingly meritorious claims.' 51 What
is not understandable is the invocation of these same common
147. See e.g., Florence Mfg. Cd. v. J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 Fed. 73 (2d
Cir. 1910).
148. 7 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1925), rev'd on other grounds, 273 U.S. 132
(1927).
149. E.g., Shaw Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Des Moines Dress Club,
215 Iowa 1130, 1137-39, 245 N.W. 231, 234-35 (1932).
150. E.g., Fowler v. Curtis Publishing Co., 182 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir.
1950); Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Martin, 64 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1933).
151. E.g., Show Management v. Hearst Publishing Co., 196 Cal. App.
2d 606, 16 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1961) (deceptive advertising); Shaw Cleaners
& Dyers, Inc. v. Des Moines Dress Club, 215 Iowa 1130, 245 N.W. 231
(1932) (false disparagement).
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law prerequisites where attempts are made to enjoin deceptive
advertising and false disparagement. In the leading case of
Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields,152 the New York Court of Ap-
peals dismissed an action to enjoin the publisher of a sportsmen's
magazine from printing spurious letters-to-the-editor discrediting
plaintiff-manufacturer's rifles on the alternative ground that
the alleged falsity and perversity o2: the defendant's conduct was
immaterial in the absence of an averment of special damage.
In a revealing comment, the court of appeals stated: "We need
not stop to consider the reason for the rule [requiring special
damage] for it has been too long and too firmly established to
admit of questioning at this day.""15 3 Though Marlin's uncom-
promising equation of the prerequisites for equitable and legal
relief for false disparagement has been modified by subsequent
New York decisions, Marlin retains disquieting vitality as a prece-
dent today..5 4 Similar decisions exist with respect to the avail-
ability of equitable relief against deceptive advertising.155
It is fatuous to make the availability of equitable relief
against deceptive advertising and false disparagement depend
on proof of special damage. If special damage can be readily
proved, injunctive relief may well be unnecessary and unavail-
able because of the adequacy of the plaintiff's remedy at law.
In those situations in which special damage cannot be established,
but it is nonetheless probable that the defendant's conduct is
inflicting harm on the plaintiff, an injunction is appropriate pre-
cisely because damage cannot be proved. Thus, in Carter v.
Knapp Motor Co.,556 the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed an
injunction against the prominent display of a Hudson auto-
mobile festooned with white elephants by a consumer who had
demanded and been refused unwarranted free repairs by a local
Hudson dealer. The court alluded to allegations that the dealer
had received numerous inquiries concerning the merit of Hudson
152. 171 N.Y. 384, 64 N.E. 163 (1902) (alternative holding). The
court also invoked the hoary maxim that "equity will not enjoin a
libel." Modem judges have acknowledged the existence of equitable
jurisdiction with respect to false disparagement and consider that the
issue of undue restraint of speech is primarily relevant to the grant or
denial of relief in particular cases. E.g., Krebiozen Research Foundation
v. Beacon Press, Inc., 334 Mass. 86, 134 N.E.2d 1, cert. denied, 352 U.S.
848 (1956); Mayfair Farms, Inc. v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 68 N.J. Super.
188, 195-96, 172 A.2d 26, 29-30 (1961).
153. 171 N.Y. at 391, 64 N.E. at 165 (1902).
154. Eversharp, Inc. v. Pal Blade Co., 182 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1950).
155. E.g., Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.
1925), rev'd on other grounds, 273 U.S. 132 (1927).
156. 243 Ala. 600, 11 So. 2d 383 (1943).
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automobiles following the display of the car and concluded:
Complainant's damages can not be measured-it is unable to lay
its finger, perhaps, upon the loss of a single sale of a car or of
a single customer. But the averments show many inquiries
indicating some doubt in the minds of the public thus aroused,
increasing as the unlawful conduct continues and as time goes
on.... The inadequacy of the remedy at law sufficiently is
made to appear. 5 7
The Uniform Act assimilates the approach of Carter with
respect to the enjoinability of deceptive advertising and false
disparagement published by businessmen.158 Sections 2(a) (5)-
(8) declare that false disparagement and certain common types
of deceptive advertising are deceptive trade practices; and sec-
tion 3(a) states:
A person likely to be damaged by a deceptive trade practice of
another may be granted an injunction against it under the prin-
ciples of equity and on terms that the court considers reason-
able. Proof of monetary damage, [or] loss of profits ... is not
required.159
The Uniform Act essentially permits the courts to utilize
the same discretionary equitable relief in false disparagement
and deceptive advertising cases which they have customarily
exercised in trade symbol infringement cases. The other salient
features of the standard of actionability posited by the act are
dispensation with intent to deceive, competition between the par-
ties, and evidence of actual confusion or misunderstanding as
fixed conditions of relief.
The injunctive remedy of the Uniform Act makes it reason-
able to have the substantive provisions of the Act reach un-
intentional as well as intentional conduct. 60 There is ample
precedent for such a dispensation with "intent to deceive" as an
element of enjoinable trade symbol infringement' 61 and decep-
tive advertising.1'6 2  However, the actionability of good-faith,
false disparagement apart from the Uniform Act is less clear.
The original Restatement of Torts recognized liability for dis-
paragement even though an injurious false statement was ut-
tered without knowledge of its falsity. 63 Nevertheless, Dean
157. Id. at 603, 11 So. 2d at 384-85.
158. The Act is limited to deceptive practices committed in the course
of a "business, vocation, or occupation." UNiro~mv ACT § 2(a).
159. UNiromv ACT § 3 (a).
160. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Introductory Note, ch. 35, at 540-41 (1938).
161. E.g., LaTouraine Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 157 F.2d 115,
118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 771 (1946).
162. E.g., Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641,
648 (3d Cir. 1958).
163. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 625 (1938).
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Prosser has steadfastly maintained that this position is based on
a misjudgment as to the mainstream of authority,'10 4 and in the
draft Restatement of Torts (Second) he squarely repudiates it.
Liability, we are now told, does not exist unless the publisher is
motivated by ill will, knows that his statement is false, is unsure
whether his statement is true, or intends to interfere with the
interests of another in an unprivileged manner.165
Prosser's mode of bringing the Restatement of Torts back into
the mainstream of American law may be unexceptionable inso-
far as substantial damage liability is concerned; but why, on
principle if not authority, should the enjoinability of false state-
ments be similarly circumscribed? If false statements are suf-
ficiently injurious and their disseminator refuses to cease publi-
cation on demand, a businessman ought to be able to initiate
proceedings for a court order to cease publication even though
the defendant is merely negligent in failing to note the inac-
curacy of his comments. The Restatement (Second) view does,
of course, permit injunctive proceedings against an originally
careless defendant who persists in repeating his false statements
after convincing evidence of their falsity has been presented to
him, but invariably requiring a plaintiff to put a defendant in
bad faith before suit can unnecessarily delay redress for seri-
ous grievances. Indeed, one writer has advocated a negligence
standard for damage as well as injunctive liability flowing from
disparagement. 166
The Uniform Act's discarding of competition between the
parties as an indispensible element of a deceptive trade practice is
a response to the evolution of complex channels of distribution
and national economic markets. It is a fact that a retailer's or a
wholesaler's false disparagement of a product vended by com-
peting retailers or wholesalers can. cause a loss of sales to the
164. Prosser, Injurious Falsehood: The Basis of Liability, 59 COLUM.
L. RE V. 425, 430-39 (1959).
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 623A and accompanying Note
to the Institute (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967).
166. Comment, Law of Commercial Disparagement: Business Defa-
mation's Impotent Ally, 63 YALE L.J. 65, 78-84 (1953). See also Develop-
ments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HAzv. L. REv. 888, 895-97 (1964)
(supporting the Restatement (First)'s strict liability view with respect
to competitors and favoring a negligence standard with respect to non-
competitors). For judicial flirtation with the strict liability approach of
the Restatement (First) see Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press,
Inc., 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939); Royer v. Stoody Co., 192 F. Supp. 949
(W.D. Okla. 1961); Black & Yates, Inc. v. Mahogany Ass'n, Inc., 129 F.2d
227, 230 (3d Cir. 1941) (dictum), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 672 (1942).
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manufacturer of the disparaged product.167 It is a fact that the
adoption of a trade symbol by a junior user in a local market can
cause economic injury to the senior user of the trade symbol if
the latter is subsequently forced to develop a new trade symbol in
order to penetrate the local market.'68 By dispensing with com-
petition between the parties as a prerequisite to relief, the Uni-
form Act permits the courts to weigh the probability of economic
damage to a plaintiff under modern economic conditions.
The Uniform Act's declaration that evidence of actual con-
fusion or misunderstanding is not necessary to establish likeli-
hood of confusion or misunderstanding is in one sense a mere
reiteration of the proposition, which is apparent from the face of
the statute, that evidence of a likelihood of confusion or misunder-
standing can be sufficient to establish trade symbol infringement
under sections 2 (a) (2) and 2 (a) (3), as well as a general, section
2 (a) (12) deceptive trade practice. 69 However, the principal pur-
pose of this provision is to make clear that the testimony of con-
sumers concerning their reactions to a defendant's marketing
methods is not a predicate to establishing these deceptive trade
practices. In appropriate cases, judges may infer from the na-
ture of the defendant's conduct and from the market context
within which it occurs that there is a probability of consumer
confusion or misunderstanding. Thus, in Maternally Yours, Inc.
v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc.,'7 0 the Second Circuit upheld a
finding of fact, based largely on circumstantial evidence, that
sufficient likelihood of confusion existed to constitute federal
statutory trade symbol infringement. The plaintiff had regis-
tered "Maternally Yours" with respect to the retail sale of ma-
ternity wear; and the defendant had subsequently opened a
competing business called "Your Maternity Shop." Judge Water-
man commented:
In this case the similarity of the names is not so marked as to
itself create the probability that reasonably prudent consumers
would be confused. But when the relatively circumscribed
area of concurrent use (the New York metropolitan area), the
narrow specialty market within that area to which the con-
current use was largely confined (retail maternity apparel
shops), the close proximity of many of the stores, the novelty of
plaintiff's trade-mark, and the seemingly studied imitation by
defendant of plaintiff's signs, labels, boxes, advertising slogans,
167. See, e.g., Electrolux Corp. v. Val-Worth, Inc., 6 N.Y.2d 556, 161
N.E.2d 197, 190 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1959) (manufacturer v. retailer).
168. See, e.g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Central Publishing Co.,
117 F. Supp. 824 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
169. See UNwORM ACT §§ 2(a) (2), 2(a) (3), 2(a) (12).
170. 234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956).
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and telephone listings, all are taken into account, the likelihood
of confusion is adequately established. 171
As Maternally Yours illustrates, consumer testimony is not
necessary to establish federal statutory trade symbol infringe-
ment. The Federal Trade Commission likewise tends to utilize
circumstantial evidence rather than consumer testimony in de-
termining whether conduct is deceptive.'7 2 The importance of
consumer testimony is downplayed in these proceedings partially
because of the difficulty and expense involved in obtaining
such testimony.17 3 The effort involved in locating specific con-
sumers who have been misled by an advertising campaign
can be disproportionate to the significance of their testimony.
Moreover, if consumer testimony concerning actual confusion or
misunderstanding were critical to establishing the existence of
likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding, there would be a
vexing question as to how much consumer testimony was neces-
sary in each particular case. If 1,000 persons in the market for
shoes have observed defendant's trade symbol, how many of
these persons would have to testify that they mistook defend-
ant's shoes for plaintiff's in order to provide evidence of a sig-
nificant amount of actual confusion or misunderstanding? 1'7 4 A
likelihood-of-confusion-or-misunderstanding test which does not
require any consumer testimony avoids the opaque issue of how
much consumer testimony is enough to establish a significant
amount of actual confusion or misunderstanding, yet permits use
of whatever consumer testimony is readily available to establish
likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding. In Maternally
Yours, for example, the Second Circuit noted that the testimony
of one consumer "bolstered" the conclusion, derived primarily
from circumstantial evidence, that likelihood of confusion ex-
isted. 7 5
The foregoing discussion has adumbrated the nature of the
improved private remedy provided by the Uniform Act. The Act
sketches a number of specific deceptive trade practices which
judges can find actionable and declares that the absence of com-
petition, an intent to deceive on the part of the defendant, and
provable damages caused by the deceptive trade practices are
171. Id. at 543.
172. E.g., Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676
(2d Cir. 1944); Zenith Radio Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1944).
173. See Miles Shoes, Inc. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 199 F.2d 602
(2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 909 (1953).
174. See VANDENBURGH, TRADmviAmr LAw AND PROcEDURE 105-07
(1959).
175. 234 F.2d at 543 (2d Cir. 1956).
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not necessarily bars to equitable relief. The Act constitutes a
legislative declaration that the courts shall no longer treat claims
for equitable relief from deceptive trade practices any differently
than other claims for equitable relief-that injunctive relief shall
be potentially available wherever commercial conduct can rea-
sonably be considered to be both deceptive and injurious. This
is hardly a startling proposition. It is novel in the deceptive
trade practices context primarily because the common law pre-
requisites of equitable relief were unnecessarily analogized from
the prerequisites of a damage recovery.
Comprehension of the nature of the improved private remedy
afforded by the Uniform Act also provides the key to under-
standing the substance of the uniformity which will be brought
about by the Act. The Act details a number of specific deceptive
trade practices and declares that these acts, plus other similar
acts, can be found enjoinable regardless of the absence of com-
petition between the parties, intent to deceive on the part of
the defendant, and provable damage to the plaintiff. How-
ever, whether an injunction will actually be issued in any case
which a plaintiff attempts to fit within a statutory pigeonhole
depends on the sound discretion of the trial judge. This is an
inherently nonuniform aspect of any general statute invoking
equity jurisdiction. As precedents accumulate, patterns will de-
velop in the exercise of discretion, but the role of precedent in
equity jurisprudence is characterized by the homely adage that
every tub stands on its own bottom. This is why section 2(a)
(12)'s invitation to the courts to recognize new deceptive trade
practices is not out of place in the Uniform Act. Uniformity is
an elusive concept where the legality of conduct depends upon
the application of general standards to varied factual situations.
During congressional hearings on a proposed federal unfair
trade practices statute, a witness testifying in favor of the bill
cited several examples of "divergent results" in state courts as
evidence of the necessity for uniform unfair trade practices legis-
lation.176 One pair of these cases illustrates the ease with which
differing exercises of discretion can be confused with lack of
uniformity. In Electrolux Corp. v. Valworth, Inc.,'7 7 the New
York Court of Appeals reinstated a permanent injunction against
the use of advertised bargains in order to attract customers who
176. Hearings on H.R. 4651 Before a Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 20
(1964) (statement of Sidney A. Diamond).
177. 6 N.Y.2d 556, 161 N.E.2d 197, 190 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1959).
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were then switched through false disparagement to the purchase
of more expensive goods. On the other hand, despite the alleged
existence of a similar scheme, the Appellate Division of the New
Jersey Superior Court reversed the grant of a temporary injunc-
tion in General Elec. Co. v. Gem Vacuum Stores, Inc.178
Defendant's affidavits in General Elec. contradicted plain-
tiff's assertion that false disparagement was used to effect the
switching of customers, and a pertinent New Jersey statute had
apparently not been complied with by the plaintiff.179 The di-
verse results in Electrolux and General Elec. did not, therefore,
derive from a lack of uniformity in state law. The different types
of injunctive relief sought by the respective plaintiffs and the
different postures of the respective records on appeal justified the
varying results.
If the Electrolux and General Elec. cases had arisen under
the Uniform Act, the results might well have been the same.
The Act enhances a judge's power to grant injunctive relief
against deceptive trade practices, but does not require exercise
of that power. Nevertheless, widespread enactment of the Uni-
form Act will create a basic uniformity in deceptive trade prac-
tices law which is woefully lacking today. Deceptive advertising
and false disparagement, as well as trade symbol infringement,
will be potentially enjoinable by any person "likely to be dam-
aged," and there will be a uniform statutory definition of these
torts which will provide a common standard of actionability.
At first blush, it might seem that section 2(a) (12)'s broad
proscription of "any other conduct which similarly creates a like-
lihood of confusion or of misunderstanding" will undermine the
uniformity that will be achieved through enactment of the Uni-
form Act. What, for example, will preclude differing state con-
ceptions as to the substantive content of section 2 (a) (12) ? A par-
tial rejoinder is that well-reasoned decisions under section 2 (a)
(12) in one state should be highly persuasive in other states
where the Uniform Act has been enacted. Natural osmosis in
this respect should be accelerated by the declaration in section 5
of the Uniform Act that "this Act shall be construed to effectuate
its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which
178. 36 N.J. Super. 234, 115 A.2d 626 (App. Div. 1955).
179. N.J. STAT. ANw. §§ 56:4-1&2 (1964) authorizes a trade symbol
user to sue persons who misrepresent the value or quality of his products
in contravention of a prohibitory notice affixed to the products. The
plaintiff in General Elec. did not allege that he had utilized the notice
prescribed by the statute.
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enact it."'80
A more adequate response is that the Uniform Act was
intended to achieve several objects. The goal of establishing uni-
form recognition of the actionability of deceptive trade practices
is attained through the specification of a core of eleven deceptive
trade practices in section 2(a), all of which section 3(a) makes
potentially actionable by any person "likely to be damaged." On
the other hand, section 2(a) (12) implements the broader pur-
poses of facilitating further evolution of deceptive trade prac-
tices law and of orienting state unfair trade practices law toward
suppression of deceptive trade practices. Furthermore, a uni-
form interpretation of section 2(a) (12) will be fostered if the
courts utilize that section to assimilate Federal Trade Commission
precedents into the law of deceptive trade practices.
The Federal Trade Commission has established an impres-
sive array of precedents concerning deceptive trade practices
which can be utilized in the application of section 2(a) (12).181
By way of illustration, the Commission has ruled that it is a
violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act for
a businessman to complain to the Commission about a competitor
and then to publicize the fact that a complaint has been lodged
with the Commission before the Commission has decided whether
to act on the complaint.1 82 This Federal Trade Commission prec-
edent suggests that it should be considered a section 2 (a) (12)
deceptive trade practice for a party-plaintiff to publicize the
initiation of proceedings under the Uniform Act before a deter-
mination of his claims on the merits-unless he has an extenuat-
ing reason for doing so. A plaintiff, for example, should be
privileged to warn persons dealing in goods bearing what he be-
lieves to be infringing trade symbols that an action has been
commenced under the Uniform Act against the user of the trade
symbol and that that person's distributors and dealers are simi-
larly subject to suit. 8 3 On the other hand, a plaintiff should
be considered to violate section 2(a) (12) where, merely having
filed a complaint which invokes the Uniform Act, he gratui-
tously informs customers of the defendant who are not pursu-
180. UNmromv ACT § 5.
181. See Weston, Deceptive Advertising and the Federal Trade Com-
mission: Decline of Caveat Emptor, 24 FED. B.J. 548, 557 (1964); cf.
People v. National Research Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 20 Cal. Rptr. 516
(1962).
182. United States Prods. Co., 7 F.T.C. 301 (1924).
183. Lucien LeLong, Inc. v. Dana Perfumes, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 575
(N.D. Ill. 1955).
1967] 1039
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ing similar conduct that the defendant is engaging in a deceptive
trade practice.18 4
Several caveats are necessary with respect to the use of Fed-
eral Trade Commission precedents in the interpretation of sec-
tion 2(a) (12). The FTC asserts authority to suppress advertis-
ing which is misleading to "the gullible and credulous, as well as
the cautious and knowledgeable."'1 5 Thus, an FTC determination
that a particular representation is deceptive should only be per-
suasive authority under section 2(a) (12) if the Commission has
convincingly established that the representation is important
and misleading to an appreciable number of consumers. In its
zeal to protect the public, the Commission sometimes attacks
representations that are not important to many consumers and
that are misleading to even fewer. In Etablissements Rigaud,
Inc. 8 6 for example, the Commission ordered an American cor-
poration which imported French perfume essences and mixed
them with alcohol in the United States to refrain from using
virtually any French or other foreign term to designate, to de-
scribe, or to refer to its perfume without an accompanying Eng-
lish translation. The Second Circuit was moved to comment:
It is doubtless permissible to forbid the use of words which
indicate a French origin and manufacture when strictissimi juris
there is none, but we can see no reason for proscribing the use
of all French words when designating the perfumes or for the
rather fantastic requirement of the order that the price of re-
tention must be an accompanying English translation. 8 7
The Rigaud case is an instance of FTC misapplication of the
reasonable doctrine that consumer deception can result where a
seller falsely represents that his goods come from a geographical
area renowned for producing that type of goods. The doctrine
itself is germane to the Uniform Act, only its misapplication
should be rejected. However, there is another FTC doctrine con-
cerning deception as to geographic origin which should be re-
jected in toto under the Uniform Act.
The Commission presumes that the American public prefers
domestic to foreign goods and that it is accordingly deceptive to
184. Cf. Black & Yates, Inc. v. Mahogany Ass'n, Inc., 129 F.2d 227
(3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 672 (1942).
185. Heinz W. Kirchner, No. 8538, 1963-1965 CCH FTC COMPLAINTS,
ORDERS, AND STIPULATIONS 16664, at 21539 (1963), affd on other grounds,
337 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1964); see generally Millstein, The Federal Trade
Commission and False Advertising, 64 CoLUM. L. REV. 439, 457-65 (1964).
186. 29 F.T.C. 1032 (1939), modified, 125 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1942).
The Rigaud case is discussed in Alexander, Some Competitive Virtues
in the False naming of Goods, 39 So. CAL. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1966).
187. 125 F.2d 590, 591 (2d Cir. 1942).
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sell foreign goods in this country without affirmative disclosure
of the country of origin.188 The Commission's presumption is
based on official notice that American consumers prefer domes-
tic products and is concededly rebuttable:
The Commission is well aware, for example, that a man who
prefers an American-made watch band or hand tool may not
prefer American cigars, perfume, caviar or scotch.... But we
are not barred from taking official notice of a general fact
merely because it is not a universal fact.189
The admittedly tentative nature of the Commission's offi-
cial notice of consumer preference for domestic goods means
that this fact should not be a subject of judicial notice under the
Uniform Act.190 Administrative agencies have an affirmative
duty to formulate sound regulatory policy and accordingly make
use of official notice to effectuate the policies of the statutes that
they administer.19 On the other hand, courts function largely as
arbiters of private disputes and typically confine judicial notice
to matters of common knowledge and facts capable of accurate
and ready demonstration. 92 The deceptive nature of failure to
disclose the foreign origin of goods should accordingly be a
question of fact under the Uniform Act-with the burden of
going forward with the evidence on the plaintiff.
VI. FEDERAL ENACTMENT OF THE UNIFORM ACT
Proponents of uniformity with respect to unfair trade prac-
tices law have espoused federal as well as uniform state legis-
lation as the vehicle for achieving this goal.193 In general, even
188. Manco Watch Strap Co., 60 F.T.C. 495 (1962). UNIOIuR ACT
§ 2 (a) (4), which proscribes use of deceptive representations or designa-
tions of geographic origin, is more pertinent to this particular FTC doc-
trine than § 2(a) (12) of the act. Nonetheless, the FTC decisions dealing
with disclosure of foreign origin illustrate a type of FTC precedent
which should not be read into the Uniform Act.
189. Manco Watch Strap Co., 60 F.T.C. 495, 514 (1962).
190. Official notice and judicial notice are devices by which admin-
istrative agencies and courts interject facts into administrative and
judicial proceedings without formal evidence of those facts being intro-
duced by the parties. Procedural fairness requires that parties adversely
affected have an opportunity to controvert facts that are proposed to be
established by official or judicial notice. See generally 2 DAvis, ADMIN-
ISTTIVE LAW § 15.14 (1958); McCoRMIcK, EviDENcE § 331 (1954).
191. 2 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 190, §§ 15.05-.06.
192. McCORMXcK, op. cit. supra note 190, § 331.
193. E.g., Diamond, The Proposed Federal Unfair Commercial Ac-
tivities Act, 23 OHIo ST. L.J. 110 (1962) (federal legislation); Handler,
Unfair Competition, 21 IowA L. REv. 175, 259-62 (1936) (federal and
uniform state legislation); Rogers, Unfair Competition, 35 TRADEmARK
REP. 126 (1945) (uniform state legislation); Rogers, New Concepts of
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the supporters of federal legislation have acknowledged the value
of a continued state potential for innovation and have favored a
nonpreemptive federal statute.9 4
Though the sweep and relative simplicity of a federal enact-
ment have an obvious appeal,195 the plain facts are that the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have promulgated the
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, which was enacted in
five states in the space of one year; 196 whereas the principal
federal proposal to date has been introduced fruitlessly into four
successive Congresses, 97 and has received chilly and inconclu-
sive hearings in the House. 198 This raises the question whether
it would be expedient for advocates of federal legislation to con-
sider enactment of the Uniform Act on the federal level. 9
The issue is eminently timely. Despite a few calls for federal
enactment of the Uniform Act,20 0 a major effort is underway to
enact an amendment to section 43 (a) of the Federal Lanham
Trademark Act which encompasses far more than deceptive trade
practices. 201 A comparison of this new federal proposal with the
Uniform Act is instructive.
Unfair Competition Under the Lanham Act, 38 TRADEMARK REP. 259
(1948) (federal legislation).
194. E.g., Diamond, supra note 193, at 118. A notable exception is
Judge Henry J. Friendly who favors "a federal statute occupying the
field of unfair competition in interstate commerce, which could then be
copied by the states. . . ." Friendly, Satisfaction, Yes-Complacency,
No! 51 A.B.A.J. 715, 720 (1965).
195. Uniform state acts move more or less slowly across the country
and have a disconcerting tendency to acquire nonuniform amendments.
Peterson, The Legislative Mandate of Sears and Compco: A Plea for a
Federal Law of Unfair Competition, 69 DICK. L. REv. 347, 375 (1965).
196. Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, and Oklahoma, see note
5 supra. The Uniform Act was enacted in Kansas in 1967. Ibid.
197. H.R. 7833, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.R. 4590, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1961); H.R. 10038, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); H.R. 4651, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. 5514, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
198. Hearings on H.R. 4651 Before a Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1964).
199. Congressional enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code for
the District of Columbia is a serviceable precedent. D.C. CODE ANN. tit.
28(I) (Supp. V, 1966). Federal enactment would also undoubtedly ac-
celerate the Uniform Act's passage through state legislatures. Cf. Brauch-
er, Federal Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAw &
CoNTEmP. PROB. 100, 104 (1951).
200. Pattishall, The Unfair Commercial Activities Bill, 9 IDEA 155,
160 (Conference No. 1965); Peterson, The Legislative Mandate of Sears
and Compco: A Plea For a Federal Law of Unfair Competition, 69 DicK.
L. REV. 347, 376 (1965).
201. S. 1154, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); The Proposed Federal Un-
fair Competition Statute, 57 TRuAEMARK REP. 87 (1967).
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The draft section 43 (a) amendment provides in part:
Any person who shall engage in any act, trade practice, or
course of conduct, in commerce, which-
(1) causes or is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or de-
ception as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his
goods, services, or vocational activities, or
(2) either by a false or misleading statement or by omis-
sion of material information, misrepresents his goods, services,
vocational activities, or their geographic origin, or misrepresents
or disparages another person's goods, services, vocational ac-
tivities, or their geographic origin, or
(3) results or is likely to result in passing off the goods,
services, or vocational activities which he offers as or for those
of any other person, or
(4) results or is likely to result in the wrongful disclosure
or misappropriation of a trade secret or other research or de-
velopment or commercial information maintained in confidence
by another, or
(5) results or is likely to result in misappropriation of
quasi-property of another, not otherwise protected by Federal
statute, or
(6) without being limited to or by the foregoing subsec-
tions (1) through (5), is otherwise contrary to commercial good
faith or to normal and honest practices of the business or voca-
tional activity in which he is engaged, shall be liable in a
civil action for unfair competition .... Provided, That it shall
not be necessary to prove competition between the parties, ac-
tual confusion, mistake, or deception, or intent to injure the
business or vocational activity of any other person or the good-
will thereof.20
2
Aside from the matter of remedies which will be discussed
subsequently, the proposed section 43 (a) amendment differs from
the Uniform Act in the inclusion of misappropriation of commer-
cial intangibles, trade secret infringement, and, arguably, truth-
ful disparagement as specific substantive offenses. The proposed
section 43(a) amendment also contains a catch-all provision con-
demning conduct which is contrary to "commercial good faith"
or "normal and honest practices" which has no counterpart in
the Uniform Act. These are major differences.
By declaring that it is actionable if a person either "misrep-
resents or disparages another person's goods, services, [or] voca-
tional activities .... ,"203 the proposed section 43(a) amend-
ment implies that disparagement need not consist of misrepre-
sentations, that truthful statements which cause a probability
202. S. 1154, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (1967).
203. S. 1154, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (2) (1967). (Emphasis
added.)
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of pecuniary harm can constitute actionable disparagement.204
The Uniform Act takes precisely the opposite tack and limits
actionable disparagement to false oz' misleading representations
of fact.20 5
The desirability of widespread dissemination of true infor-
mation concerning goods, services, and businesses is a corollary
of the social interest in suppression of commercial deception.
Rational economic decisions by consumers are as much a function
of the presence of correct information as the absence of mislead-
ing information:
Consumer ignorance is ... [an] important cause of market im-
perfections. Faced with a vast selection of goods and impris-
oned by prejudice, habit and emotion, it is next to impossible
for the average consumer to buy intelligently. Family units are
not sufficiently large and their requirements are too varied to
allow a detailed investigation of all the goods purchased. Ex-
haustive laboratory tests are necessary to determine the rela-
tive merits of goods offered in the market place.206
Advertising is an important potential source of truthful com-
mercial information, but, unfortunately, a high proportion of
advertising copy attempts to persuade the consumer to buy
"Chipso" simply because it is "Chipso," rather than because of
"Chipso's" objective merits. The efficacy of such persuasive ad-
vertising from the advertiser's poi-t of view, and the urgent
need for more truthful factual information concerning products,
services, and businesses were recently underscored by the As-
sistant United States Attorney General in charge of the Anti-
trust Division. He observed that wider dissemination of com-
parative product information should be encouraged in order to
counteract the anticompetitive consequences of massive adver-
tising expenditures by large firms.207
In this context, the proposed section 43 (a) amendment's po-
tential applicability to damaging, truthful product commentary
204. It is possible to read the initial portion of § 7(a) (2) of the pro-
posed section 43(a) amendment, which refers to false or misleading
statements and misleading omissions, as qualifying that section's refer-
ence to disparagement. However, this is not a necessary reading, and
a brief prepared by advocates of the proposed amendment supports the
interpretation discussed in the text of this article by treating misrepre-
sentation and disparagement of another's goods as discrete torts. Brief
In Support of Congressional Passage of Proposed Unfair Competition
Amendment to Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 57 TRADEMARK REP. 88,
100 (1967).
205. UroFmW ACT § 2(a) (8).
206. HALE & HALE, MAPKET PowER: SIZE AND SAPE UnDER TH SHER-
mAN ACT 418 (1958).
207. BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 256: X-1 (1966).
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by professional product commentators, like Consumer Reports, is
indefensible.20 8 Truthful product commentary by disinterested
persons merits encouragement, not extinction. However, it has
been forcefully contended that commentary concerning one's
competitors should be subject to stricter legal controls.
Professor Wolff, relying primarily on the German approach
to unfair trade practices, argued that competitors should be pro-
hibited from describing their rivals or their rivals' wares to
consumers "unless vital interests of the informant, or of the
public, cannot be protected by other means. '20 9 Wolff essentially
reasoned that the intensity of a businessman's self-interest would
lead him to abuse any privilege that he was given to comment
on his competitors so that it was the better part of wisdom to
severely restrict that privilege. Yet, even under Wolff's ap-
proach, it can be plausibly maintained today that the prolifera-
tion of new products, models, and brands has created such a
need for comparative information that the vital interests of the
public cannot be adequately protected without permitting busi-
nessmen to engage in truthful discussion of their fellows. For
this very reason a recent commentator has predicted a break-
down of the German approach to truthful disparagement on
which Wolff relied so heavily: "The limitations on advertising
on a comparative basis may, at least to some extent, be abolished
soon because such advertising may be able to provoke competi-
tion .... 21
In addition to its seeming outlawry of truthful disparage-
ment, the proposed section 43(a) amendment contains a blanket
legislative endorsement of the misappropriation theory of un-
fair trade practices with few statutory clues as to what is and
what is not tortious misappropriation.21 ' Consequently, the pro-
posed amendment accentuates, rather than alleviates, the mis-
appropriation theory's imprecise emphasis on exclusive rights,
thereby enhancing the danger of misapplication of the theory
at the expense of competition. In American Safety Table Co.
208. S. 1154, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1967) allows any person
whose business is likely to be damaged by conduct forbidden by the pro-
posed amendment to sue, whether the conduct is engaged in by a com-
petitor or a noncompetitor such as Consumer Reports.
209. Wolff, Unfair Competition by Truthful Disparagement, 47 YALE
L.J. 1304, 1332 (1938).
210. Steindorff, Unfair Competition and Passing Off in Germany, in
RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES, PATENTS, TRADE MARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
IN THE CorMON MARKET 85 (Int. & Comp. L.Q. Sup. Pub. No. 4, 1962).
211. S. 1154, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (5) (1967).
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v. Schreiber,212 Judge Medina declared, "Nor are we, in view
of the deliberate plan to poach unjustifiably on Amco's good-
will, disposed to debate in detail the probabilities of confusion.
* . ."213 Despite the fact that the patents on plaintiff's machine
had either expired or were considered invalid, Judge Medina
thereupon endorsed an injunction requiring defendants to dis-
tinguish their machine from plaintiff's through significant phy-
sical alterations.
A result similar to that in American Safety Table cannot re-
cur through the application of state law because the Supreme
Court subsequently declared in the Sears and Compco cases 214
that the federal patent laws preempt state law which forbids or
penalizes the copying of unpatented or invalidly patented arti-
cles. However, Sears and Compco pose no obstacle to a replay
of American Safety Table under the proposed section 43(a)
amendment. Indeed, supporters of new federal legislation con-
cerning unfair trade practices have pointed to the need for fed-
eral legislation which would nullify the effect of Sears and
Compco.21 5 Enactment of the proposed section 43(a) amend-
ment's generalized codification of the misappropriation theory
could accordingly lead to anticompetitive judicial decrees at
worst, and, at best, to a judicial reluctance to find misappropria-
tion where no appreciable public deception would result from
the denial of relief. 2 16
The proposed section 43(a) amendment's blanket endorse-
ment of a federal action for trade secret infringement is subject
to the same criticism as its blanket endorsement of the misap-
propriation theory. Trade secret infringement is currently de-
fined by an intricate skein of common law principles which merit
specific legislative surgery rather than wholesale endorsement.2 17
212. 269 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959), modi-
fied, 287 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1961).
213. 269 F.2d at 276.
214. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). See Brown, Pro-
duct Simulation, 64 CoLum. L. REv. 1216, 1222 & n.21 (1964). The Uni-
form Act deals with Sears and Compco through § 3 (a), which provides:
"Relief granted for the copying of an article shall be limited to the
prevention of confusion or misunderstanding as to source." "Article" is
defined in § 1(1).215. E.g., Kunin, The Lindsay Bill Before and After the Stiffel Case,
54 TRADEMARK REP. 731, 745-48 (1964).
216. See Stern & Hoffman, Public Injury and the Public Interest:
Secondary Meaning in the Law of Unfair Competition, 110 U. PA. L. REV.
935, 966-71 (1962).
217. See Arnold, Trade Secrets, 9 IDPA 161-64 (Conference No. 1965);
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The proposed amendment, for example, offers no answer whatso-
ever to the present lack of clear metes and bounds as to what
is and what is not protectable as a trade secret. One writer has
trenchantly observed that "trade secret law has not successfully
regulated business conduct. Its fundamental weakness is its
inherent uncertainty. The standard of conduct, developed on
a case by case basis, only reflects each court's philosophy of com-
mercial morality. '218
The proposed section 43(a) amendment also fails to deal
with aberrational judicial tendencies to grant unnecessary and
anticompetitive relief on a trade secret theory. Under the so-
called Shellmar rule, for example, a trade secret infringer can be
perpetually enjoined from using a purloined trade secret even if
the trade secret later becomes common knowledge and a stand-
ard competitive technique. 219  The more procompetitive Con-
mar rule requires that an injunction against use of a trade secret
be denied or dissolved within a reasonable time after the secret
has become common knowledge. 22 0  However, the proposed
amendment does not acknowledge the existence of this conflict
of authority, let alone attempt to resolve it.
The proposed section 43 (a) amendment's prohibition of con-
duct contrary to "commercial good faith" and "normal and hon-
est practices" involves still greater danger of anticompetitive
misapplications. I is, of course, true that "good faith" has be-
come an increasingly relevant datum insofar as the law is con-
cerned. The Uniform Commercial Code, for example, declares
that "every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obli-
gation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.."221 How-
ever, the Code's declaration that an assumed contractual duty
entails a concomitant obligation to perform that duty in good
faith is fundamentally different from the proposed amend-
ment's declaration that every merchant has an imposed duty to
act in good faith, regardless of his willingness to assume that
duty.
The Code does not, for instance, impose a duty to perform in
see generally Arnold, Problems in Trade Secret LatW, 1961 ABA PRO-
cEEDiNGs 248.
218. Note, The Trade Secret Quagmire-A Proposed Federal Solu-
tion, 50 Nmn. L. REv. 1049, 1054 (1966).
219. Shellmar Prods. Co. v. Alen-Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir.
1936), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 695 (1937).
220. Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d
150 (2d Cir. 1949).
221. UNn mom CowwnmcIAL CODE § 1-203.
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good faith a contract which constitutes an unreasonable restraint
of trade. Contracts in unreasonable restraint of trade are unen-
forceable at common law,222 and section 1-103 of the Code pro-
vides that common law principles concerning the validity of con-
tracts supplement the Code unless specifically displaced.223 On
the other hand, the proposed section 43(a) amendment's unqual-
ified references to "commercial good faith" and "normal and
honest practices" are broad enough to constitute a legislative
declaration that deviations from anticompetitive as well as pro-
competitive trade customs are actionable. A businessman's dis-
regard of his competitors' preferences for avoiding truthful com-
parative product commentary,22 4 price comparisons, 225 or price
competition itself could, for example, be considered actionable
under the proposed amendment where the nonconformist gar-
nered a sale or two!
The nature of a contractual duty which has been assumed
also provides a precise context in which to ascertain good and
bad faith on the basis of trade custom, course of dealing, course
of performance, and other objective factors relevant to that con-
text; whereas the universal obligation to engage in good faith
conduct imposed by the proposed section 43(a) amendment has
less specific referents. A brief submitted in support of the pro-
posed amendment suggests that actionable departures from "com-
mercial good faith" and "normal and honest practices" need not
even be tied to violation of trade customs and commercial under-
standings. The brief states: "Section 43(a) (6) is designed to
be a general provision of the type that will allow the federal
courts sufficient latitude to fashion and develop a uniform and
effective body of federal law in the field of unfair commercial
activities. '226  This would appear to be an invitation for the
chancellor to use his foot wherever he deems it necessary.
The brief seeks to justify a sweeping condemnation of com-
mercial bad faith through invocation of several questionable
"precedents. '"2 7  First and foremost, the brief relies on provi-
sions condemning bad-faith competition in two multilateral trea-
222. E.g., Gamewell Fire-Alarm Tel. Co. v. Crane, 160 Mass. 50, 35
N.E. 98 (1893).
223. UNIovR COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-103.
224. See Wolff, Unfair Competition by Truthful Disparagement, 47
YALE L.J. 1304, 1317 (1938).
225. See id. at 1328.
226. Brief In Support of Congressional Passage of Proposed Unfair
Competition Amendment to Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 57 TRADE-
MARK REP. 88, 104 (1967).
227. Id. at 104-05.
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ties to which the United States is a party: the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property and the Inter-American
Trade-Mark Convention.228  The Supreme Court has held that
the Inter-American Convention is self-executing,229 but both
treaties indicate that their declarations concerning unfair trade
practices are not self-executing after those declarations have been
implemented by the domestic legislation of a signatory.230 In
the United States, the implementing legislation with respect to
both treaties is the Federal Lanham Trademark Act.231  Since
present section 43 (a), which the proposed federal statute seeks
to amend, is part of the Lanham Act, it follows that the Ameri-
can domestic legislation implementing the Paris Convention and
the Inter-American Convention has never adopted the compre-
hensive bad-faith conception of unfair trade practices which ap-
pears in those treaties. 232 These treaty provisions, consequently,
are not "precedents" for the proposed amendment to section 43
(a) in the sense of providing empirical evidence that a tort con-
sisting of the exhibition of commercial bad faith constitutes
either a useful or a manageable concept of tort liability.
233
The other "precedents" are also inapposite. Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act's proscription of "unfair meth-
ods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in commerce 234 is not analogous to the proposed
section 43(a) amendment because section 5 is administered by
the Federal Trade Commission, a public agency constrained by
Congress to proceed only in the public interest.235 The proposed
section 43(a) amendment relates to a private right of action, and
228. Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property,
Oct. 31, 1958, art. 10 (Bis) 13 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 26, 37 T.I.A.S. No. 4931;
Convention and Protocol With Other American Republics for the Protec-
tion of Trademarks, Feb. 20, 1929, arts. 20-22, 46 Stat. 2907, 2930-34, T.S.
No. 833.
229. Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 161 (1940); see also
Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 640-41 & n.9 (2d
Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956) (Paris Convention).
230. See Convention of Paris, supra note 228, art. 10 (Ter); Inter-
American Convention, supra note 228, arts. 21-22.
231. 60 Stat. 443 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1964).
232. Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Lab., Inc., 269 F.2d 375,
388-89 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 893 (1959); see Kunin, Eriean-
tompkinitis: The Malady and Its Cure, 1961 ABA PROCEEDINGS 276, 278-79.
233. Even if it is maintained that the Lanham Act improperly nar-
rows the protection promised by the treaties, the fact remains that there
has been no American experience with an operative rule of tort liability
like that enunciated in the treaties.
234. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1964).
235. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964).
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it is open to question whether persons primarily concerned with
private interests should be allowed as great a privilege to sue
other businessmen as is vested in the Federal Trade Commission.
As the Justice Department observed in connection with a fore-
runner of the proposed section 43 (a) amendment:
The principal objection to this legislation is that it would
create a potentially dangerous anti-competitive weapon. The
breadth of the definition of "unfair commercial activities"
would extend the private injunctive remedy into new areas in
which the courts have been consistently reluctant to ven-
ture.236
Nor is California Civil Code Section 3369 a meaningful
precedent. Section 3369 condemns "unlawful, unfair, or fraudu-
lent business practices," but this is not the equivalent of ex-
plicitly condemning every departure from "commercial good
faith" and "normal and honest practices." Section 3369 uses
general language to describe the scope of a private right of ac-
tion, yet section 3369 does not affirmatively compel the courts
to set sail on the uncharted seas of commercial good and bad
faith. As a consequence, the bulk of the cases adjudicated under
section 3369 have involved deceptive trade practices. A lower
California court fairly appraised the great majority of Cal-
ifornia cases interpreting section 3369 when it said: "What con-
stitutes 'unfair competition' or 'unfair or fraudulent business
practice' under any given set of circumstances is a question of
fact . . . the essential test being whether the public is likely to
be deceived .... 237
Aside from its ill-advised applicability to truthful dispar-
agement, the essential substantive defect of the proposed section
43(a) amendment is the unparalleled generality of the codifica-
tion of private remedies for misappropriation, trade secret in-
fringement, and the all-encompassing tort of bad faith commer-
cial practices. Although section 2(a) (12) of the Uniform Act,
which declares actionable "any other conduct which similarly
creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding," also
constitutes a broad standard of illegality, section 2(a) (12)
does not raise the same problems as the proposed section 43 (a)
amendment.
236. Hearings on H.R. 4651 Before a Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 7
(1964) (letter from Nicholas Katzenbach, then Deputy Attorney Gener-
al).
237. People v. National Research Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 772, 20
Cal. Rptr. 516, 521 (1962). Cf. International Ass'n of Cleaning & Dye
House Workers v. Landowitz, 20 Cal. 2d 418, 126 P.2d 609 (1942).
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Section 2 (a) (12) utilizes the existence of probable consumer
deception as the test of illegality. This standard not only per-
mits an objective inquiry into the existence of a section 2(a) (12)
violation; it focuses section 2(a) (12) on a type of commercial
conduct which is generally harmful both to consumers and to
other businessmen.2 38 In contrast, the triad of indefinite statu-
tory torts created by the proposed section 43(a) amendment-
misappropriation, trade secret infringement, and bad faith com-
mercial conduct-involve alleged wrongs to businessmen which
may in fact benefit consumers. The copying of an unpatented
and uncopyrighted product by a competitor may, for example,
appropriate the fruits of the first businessman's innovation; but
it may also result in greater availability of the product to the
public, and lower prices. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stif el Co.23 9
the Supreme Court noted that Sears' copying of Stiffel's pole
lamps resulted in Sears' retail price approximating Stiffel's
wholesale price.240
The fact that consumers may benefit from conduct which is
made actionable by the proposed section 43(a) amendment does
not necessarily mean that that conduct should not be made ac-
tionable. The possibility of consumer benefit from such conduct
does, however, suggest that the legislature should provide in-
telligible guidelines for the courts if this conduct is to be action-
able.
The indefiniteness of the conduct which is condemned by
the proposed section 43(a) amendment is particularly objec-
tionable in view of the potential consequences of engaging in
that conduct. The proposed amendment states that all of the
remedies provided in the Lanham Act shall be available for
violation of amended section 43(a).241 This means, for ex-
ample, that inadvertent commercial bad faith could subject a
businessman to an injunction,242 to forfeiture of his profits or
such sum as the court finds just under the circumstances, to
liability for plaintiff's damages, which may be trebled in the dis-
cretion of the court, to liability for court costs, 248 and, if another
aspect of the proposed amendment is enacted, to liability for
238. See text accompanying notes 49-52 supra.
239. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
240. Id. at 226.
241. S. 1154, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1967).
242. 60 Stat. 439 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1964).
243. 60 Stat. 439-40 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1964);
see Arnold, A Federal Unfair Competition Law, 57 TRADEMAR REP. 116,
121 (1967).
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plaintiff's attorneys' fees.244  The vagueness of the proposed
section 43 (a) amendment constitutes a hazardous trap for the
unwary in view of the bristling array of proposed remedies.
Although section 43(a) could profitably be redrafted, the
proposed amendment is not the answer. A more desirable ap-
proach would be to incorporate the substance of the Uniform
Act into section 43 (a) and to leave intact section 43 (a)'s present
ambivalent relationship to the arsenal of Lanham Act economic
remedies where infringement of a registered trade symbol is
not involved.
245
CONCLUSION
The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act provides a long-
awaited improvement in the private remedies for deceptive trade
practices. Deceptive advertising, false disparagement, and trade
symbol infringement which causes likelihood of confusion as to
sponsorship, approval, or certification should be potentially en-
joinable throughout the nation. However, the utility of a co-
ordinate statutory damage remedy is more questionable in view
of the difficulties of proof and the inexpediency of imposing lia-
bility for damages with respect to the inadvertent deceptive con-
duct reached by the Uniform Act. A damage remedy has con-
sequently been omitted from the Uniform Act, although section
3(c) permits the courts to analogize a common-law claim for
damages from the provisions of the act.
The Uniform Act contains a proposed nationwide standard
for the actionability of deceptive trade practices, and provides an
opportunity for increased absorption of Federal Trade Commis-
sion decisions dealing with significant commercial deception into
the law of deceptive trade practices. The substantive and reme-
dial provisions of the Uniform Act compare so favorably with the
currently proposed amendment to section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act that Congress would be well-advised to adopt the substance
of the Uniform Act in lieu of the proposed amendment. Need-
less to say, this course of action would also achieve the congru-
ency between the state and the federal statutory law of decep-
tive trade practices which is a sine qua non of a truly uniform
law of deceptive trade practices.
244. S. 1154, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. § 5 (1967).
245. See notes 81-82 supra and accompanying text.
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